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Abstract 
A great deal of research exists regarding terrorism and the various issues surrounding the 
phenomenon, however, the matter is relatively neglected in sociological research.  This study 
provides a sociological perspective on terrorism, more specifically, the societal response to the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. This study presents a theoretical perspective on the post 
9/11 response with an emphasis on the media and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  The 
theory established in this study, the Normative Tragedy Actuated Response, fundamentally 
opposes the moral panic theory, which scholars have recently applied to the 9/11 societal 
response.  Data collection on the media response and the FBI reformation presents a compelling 
argument against the belief the 9/11 societal response was characteristic of a moral panic.  This 
study provides a more comprehensive and accurate perspective on the matter and lays a 
foundation for future sociological research to build upon. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
It was Tuesday, September 11, 2001 when a seemingly ordinary work day instantly 
became history.   In a matter of just an hour and forty-two minutes the United States fell subject 
to the worst terrorist attack in the nation’s history.  The carnage in New York City, Washington 
D.C., and Shanksville, Pennsylvania left the entire nation in disbelief, anger, and heartbreak.  
The lives of 2,977 people were unjustly taken on that fateful day, leaving thousands of people 
without their loved ones. The immediate destruction only directly affected three cities in the 
United States, but the impact was felt nationwide. As the nation was unanimously bonded 
through the attacks, individuals from all over joined together to support those suffering the 
physical damage.  Cohesion and patriotism was arguably at an all time high in the United States.  
With these unexpected events terrorism was immediately the number one public concern; 
however, terrorism was certainly not a new concern.  The United States has been fighting 
terrorism since the 1920s and its prevalence increased significantly in the 1990s.  The 1993 
World Trade Center bombing, 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, 1996 Summer Olympics bombing, 
and 1998 United States Embassy bombings are a few of the most significant terrorist attacks 
during this time.  Despite several terrorist incidents preceding 9/11 it was not until that horrific 
day that the threat became respectfully acknowledged.  Amy Zegart illustrates the nations neglect 
regarding the increased terrorism risk.  According to Zegart, the United States failed to adapt and 
respond to congressional requests to increase national security throughout the mid to late 1990s.  
The 9/11 attack was worse than any previous attacks on the United States and the impact 
penetrated much farther than ever before.  
While the nation struggled to recover from the devastation, another phenomenon was 
occurring.  A societal response immediately followed the attacks. The public sector experienced 
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tremendous fear resulting from the atrocities. Terror plagued the nation which changed the way 
many individuals lived their lives.  According to Torabi and Seo’s 2004 national survey, many 
people refused to fly, take public transportation, or attend large public gatherings.  Almost 30% 
of people surveyed experienced significant life changes, which included anything from limiting 
outside activity to becoming more appreciative of family (Torabi and Seo 2004:184-187).  Fear 
surrounding potential future attacks ensued, with that, my theory, proposes the media and social 
control agents immediately responded and employed measures to ensure national security and 
ease public fear. The response following 9/11 presented a phenomenon as complex and unique as 
the terrorist act itself.  
The objective of this study is to critically analyze the post 9/11 societal response through 
2009, more specifically the responses amongst the public, the media, and the formal agents of 
social control.  Research establishing a sociological perspective on the post 9/11 societal 
response is rather sparse.  Not until the latter half of the past decade have scholars started to use a 
sociological lens to interpret this phenomenon, and even at that, the literature is predominately 
limited to the application of the moral panic theory, or, at the very least, a inherently similar 
perspective.  However, my study proposes a fundamentally conflicting theoretical perspective on 
the matter relative to the current research.  Through comparison with the moral panic theory, I 
created a new theory, the normative tragedy actuated response theory, which sociologically 
explains the 9/11 societal response and establishes a more comprehensive theory.  The following 
sections will describe how the normative tragedy actuated response theory can explain the 
societal response as an inherently necessary and appropriate societal reaction to the given threat.  
This opposes the moral panic theorists, Rothe and Muzzatti 2004 and Victor 2006, who argue the 
response was inappropriate and disproportionate to the ―perceived threat.‖ Similar to the moral 
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panic theory, my study analyzes the responses employed by the media, the public, and the agents 
of social control.  The media responded to the tremendous public fear following 9/11 through 
increased information flow.  I conducted an extensive search for terrorism related articles 
published in twenty U.S. newspapers, and the findings revealed information flow increased 
tremendously across the nation after 9/11.  The sociological perspective presented in the coming 
chapters argues the news the media disseminated regarding 9/11 helped reduce public fear.  
Furthermore, arguably the greatest response was sustained by formal agents of social control.  
My study only focuses on one agent of social control, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  
An in-depth analysis on the 9/11 response across all formal social control agents is far too large 
to conduct in one study.  Therefore, as one of the nation’s most elite law enforcement agency, I 
used the FBI to portray the formal social control agents’ response to 9/11.  Granted, the FBI 
response does not completely reflect that of other social control agents; however, the FBI 
maintains the largest law enforcement jurisdiction in the United States, and is unique in regards 
to the fact it is responsible for both national security and traditional criminal investigations.  The 
FBI is a major agent regarding social control, as the academic research on subversive groups and 
social movements will indicate (Garrow 1983; Gotham 1994; Carley 1997; Cunningham 2000; 
Cunningham 2003; Noakes and Cunningham 2008; Theoharis 2002). Thus, the FBI 9/11 
response is a relatively good reflection of the overall formal social control agents’ response to 
9/11. As one of the more prominent social control agents, the FBI experienced a substantial 
organizational development after 9/11 in order to adequately address the nation’s principal 
concerns.  The media, the FBI, and the public’s response are discussed in later sections; 
however, the next chapter describes the current literature relevant to my study.    
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Terrorism is a unique phenomenon which has evolved tremendously over the past twenty 
years.  Although the phenomenon has existed for many centuries, not until recently has it 
attracted so much attention.  Terrorist attacks were scattered throughout the 1990s as the 
phenomenon became more prevalent in the United States.  Various incidents such as the 1993 
World Trade Center bombing, 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, 1996 Summer Olympics bombing, 
and 1998 United States Embassy bombings further accentuate the problem.  Despite these 
attacks, terrorism largely went unaddressed and not until 2001, after the worst terrorist attack in 
United States history, did the issue finally received adequate attention.  The horrifying attacks on 
September 11 presented a unique and complex phenomenon; as a result, in the pursuing years, an 
unprecedented amount of literature examined terrorism.  Lum, Kennedy, and Sherley (2006) 
conducted a systematic review of terrorism literature published between 1971 and 2003, which 
consisted of any ―published, unpublished, peer-reviewed, non peer-reviewed, academic and non-
academic sources which mentioned terms related to terrorism and political violence‖ (p. 8).  
Their findings revealed that almost 54% of terrorism literature was published in 2001 and 2002.  
It is evident in the pursuing years after 9/11 terrorism became a widely researched topic.      
Motives for Terrorism 
Initially, research was centered on the act itself and the social forces driving such 
behavior.  Despite all the research, a unanimously accepted definition of terrorism is yet to be 
established, however, many scholars argue religion and politics are the fundamental motivating 
forces.  Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God (2003), characterizes terrorism as a 
form of religious violence.  Juergensmeyer studies terrorism from the Islamic fundamentalist’s 
perspective and examines the core religious values which these individuals percieve encourage 
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violent action.   Other researchers like Jeffrey Ross 2006, Political terrorism: and 
Interdisciplinary Approach, describes terrorism as violent action aimed at achieving political 
goals.  Ross explains how terrorism’s primary objective is to initiate change within a political 
system.  Many scholars investigated this phenomenon after 9/11 and this area has become over-
researched throughout the past decade.  Past literature often takes a broad approach on terrorism 
and analyzes what terrorism is and why it occurs.  Although useful in its own right, research 
must go past focusing on just the act itself and the perpetuating motives.  Instead of looking at 
terrorism as a whole my study focuses on one incident, 9/11.  Although my study does examine 
the nature of attacks to a certain extent, it is not the focus of my analysis. Rather, I focus on the 
issues surrounding the societal response to the attacks. 
September 11, 2001 
After 9/11, research regarding terrorism turned away from taking a broad overview of the 
phenomenon and established a more narrow perspective.  A great deal of this research focused 
on the 9/11 incident.  Amongst this vast array of literature, sociological perspectives seem to be 
in short.  Many psychological perspectives were established, which examined the psychological 
effect of 9/11.  Peter Fisher et. al. (2011) studied the individual psychological benefits of finding 
intellectual meaning for a terrorist attack.  In his experimental research, his findings revealed 
constructing intellectual meaning helped to reduce the negative psychological effects of a 
traumatic stimuli significantly.  Similar findings were revealed in Updegraff et. al. (2008) 
longitudinal analyses on collective trauma following 9/11.  Updegraff claims, individuals were 
actively searching for meaning only two months after the attacks, and later findings indicated 
those who effectively made sense of the attacks reported less psychological distress and anxiety.  
This research provides vital support for the inherent claim made in my study, which states the 
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media response provided the public with the means to find meaning for the 9/11 attacks.  This 
literature supplements the sociological perspective presented throughout my study.  
Additional, psychological research focuses on the mental health consequences.  Recently 
scholars have investigated the fear 9/11 established within the public sector.  Torabi and Seo 
(2004) examine the life changes initiated after 9/11.  Through detailed surveys Torabi and Seo 
reveal changes in behavior and decision making.  These surveys showed that many people 
avoided large public gatherings, in fear of another terrorist attack.  Likewise, Julie Masters 
(2005) studied the negative health consequences 9/11 had on young adults.  Masters states, 
―Studies conducted in New York and nationally after the 9/11 attacks revealed a heightened 
sense of stress and anxiety among those surveyed‖ (Masters 2005: 370).  Mark Schuster’s (2001) 
quantitative research on stress reaction indicates an increase stress level after 9/11.  Ninety 
percent of people reported at least low stress levels related to the 9/11 attacks (Schuster 2001: 
1510).   Although these studies were from a mental health perspective, they essentially depicted 
the public fear established nationwide after the 9/11 attacks.  Through a sociological perspective 
my study also characterizes the ensuing public fear, and, in fact, uses the previous research to 
support what I call, tragedy fixated apprehension.  My study describes tragedy fixated 
apprehension as the principle force throughout the entire 9/11 societal response.  The pervious 
mental health research regarding the ensuing public fear is useful in understanding the effect the 
attacks had on individuals; however, scholars fail to see the bigger picture.  My study takes a 
macro-sociological perspective regarding public fear and analyzes the social change it initiated.  
I argue this fear evolved into an insurmountable force which controlled other aspects of the 
societal response. 
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Likewise, more research focuses on other consequences of 9/11.  Literature is commonly 
concerned with the political rhetoric used in counterterrorism and immigration policies enacted 
after 9/11.    David Cole and James Dempsey (2003) address the government response post 9/11.  
Although my study also examines the response to 9/11, Cole and Dempsey take a narrower 
approach and focus only on the political aspect of this response.  My study analyzes the 9/11 
response as a separate, yet dependent, phenomenon, and accounts for  several major aspects of 
the response such as the terrorist act itself, public fear, social control agents, the media, and 
adverse consequences.  As Cole and Dempsey focus their research on the political aspect of the 
response to 9/11, they examine the faulty political rhetoric in new counterterrorism policies such 
as the 2001 USA Patriot Act.  Cole and Dempsey state ―The Patriot Act radically transformed 
the landscape of government power in ways that virtually guarantee repetition of some of the 
government’s worst abuses of the past‖ (Cole & Dempsey 2003: 218).  He criticize the power 
granted to the government in order to collect information and defend against potential terrorist 
threats, fearful that it restricts the civil liberties, particularly those protected by the First 
Amendment, promised to the citizens through the U.S. Constitution.  In a similar study, Laura 
Donohue (2008) conducts an analysis of counterterrorism law in the United States and Great 
Britain.  In her book The Cost of Counterterrorism: Power, Politics, and Liberty, Donohue 
supports Dempsey’s argument and says:  
―The constitution was designed to keep government off the backs of the people.  The Bill of Rights was 
added to keep the precincts of belief and expression, of the press, of political and social activities free from 
surveillance.  The Bill of Rights was designed to keep agents of government and official eavesdroppers 
away from assemblies of people.  The purpose of such provisions was to allow men to be free and 
independent and to assert their rights against government.  There can be no influence more paralyzing of  
that objective than army surveillance‖ (Donohue 2008: 228).   
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Similar to moral panic theorists Rothe and Muzzatti (2004), Cole and Dempsey and Donohue fail 
to account for the threat posed on society.  These scholars only acknowledge the illegal 
legislation, but do not take into consideration the fact that after 9/11 the United States drastically 
needed a revamp in homeland security.  These studies ignore the forces driving these political 
changes, which is vital in understanding such great reform, and focus solely on the political 
injustices and legality.  The theory established in my study encompasses the controversial 
legislature discussed in some of previous research, and characterizes it as an unfortunate, yet 
necessary, consequence.  Rosenfeld supports this sentiment and states ―protecting liberty and 
safeguarding security are inherently contradictory objectives, tradeoffs between them are 
inevitable and will continue to fuel public debate over desirable and effective responses‖ 
(Rosenfeld 2004: 29).  My theory acknowledges the injustices involved with such legislature, but 
also explains why such policy is necessary in securing and protecting the nation.  
Additionally, Major Michael Thompson of the United States Marine Corps (2008) also 
studies the 9/11 response, but only in regards to the United States Department of Defense (DOD) 
involvement in homeland security.  According to Major Thompson, after 9/11 the Southwest 
border experienced an increase in military presence.  Domestic military presence historically 
proposed many legal ramifications; however, past Border Protection Policy was amended after 
9/11, according to Major Thompson.  Major Thompson states ―The Army, Air Force, Marines, 
and Coast Guard have all played a significant role in securing our nation’s border along the 
southwest United States‖ (Thompson 2008: 5).   Essentially his study examined the social 
control agents response to the terrorist attacks on September 11
 
, which my study does as well; 
however, with a focus on the FBI not the DOD.   The difference between my study and Major 
Thompson’s is primarily in the fact that he only focused on one aspect of the 9/11 response, 
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while my study examines the response in several other regards, the FBI organizational 
development, media, public fear, and adverse consequences.  
FBI Organizational Development 
The theoretical perspective in my study incorporates the FBI 9/11 response which is 
characterized by reprioritization and reorganization.  The FBI organizational development has 
not yet been researched from a sociological perspective.  In fact, in general the FBI 
organizational development is still under-researched.  The studies conducted by the United States 
Department of Justice and the United States Government Accountability Office are, to my 
knowledge, the only literature published on the matter.  Collectively these studies track the FBI 
post 9/11 transformation from its inception, which consists of reallocating and reutilizing 
resources in order to better address national security concerns.  The data presented in these 
studies indicate the FBI allocated and utilized resources toward terrorism related matters at a 
much higher level after 9/11 than it did before.  Resources were predominately redirected from 
white collar crime, violent crime, and organized/drug crime in order adequately protect the 
nation against further terrorist attacks. However, the DOJ and GAO studies are strictly an 
analysis on the FBI organizational development and do not attempt to explain the social forces 
driving such transformation.  The DOJ and GAO data are used in my study to depict the FBI 
9/11 response and support why it served as an agent in reducing public fear.  The FBI 
organizational development post 9/11 is characterized in my study as one aspect of the larger 
focus, the 9/11 societal response.  
Moral Panic Theory and 9/11  
Past literature made great contributions in exploring terrorism; however, one major 
shortcoming is the sociological deficit.  Sociological research consisting of critical analysis and 
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theory are underrepresented in the realm of terrorism. Mathieu Deflem (2004) mentions, 
―Terrorism and counterterrorism are relatively neglected themes in the sociological discipline‖ 
(2008:89).  My study compensates for this shortcoming and focuses on the societal reaction to 
terrorism, which is indeed an equally intriguing phenomenon in itself.  Many scholars have 
explored small aspects of the 9/11 response, like Cole and Dempsey’s political analysis, the 
mental health research on the ensuing fear and anxiety, and Major Thompson’s DOD reform.  
However, an accurate comprehensive study regarding the phenomenon is still needed.  Recently, 
sociologists have begun to explain the 9/11 societal response as a moral panic.  Rothe and 
Muzzatti (2004) apply the moral panic theory, originally established by Stanely Cohen in regards 
to Mod and Rocker youth sub-culture, and claim the societal response to 9/11 was inappropriate 
and disproportionate to the actual threat posed one society.  Jeffrey Victor (2006) supports their 
belief and argues ―the concern [terrorism] has been hyped beyond reason‖ (2006: 1).  Data 
presented in my study empirically reveals the 9/11 was not disproportionate contrary to these 
researchers’ perspective.  Other recent research also established inherently similar beliefs 
regarding the 9/11 response.  Although Cass Sunstein was not applying the moral panic theory, 
his study on ―Probability Neglect‖ argues the fear was far greater than the probability of a 
terrorist attack occurring.  Sunstein states, ―People show a disproportionate fear of 
risk…‖(Sunstein 2003:121).  Sunstein’s psychological perspective fundamentally coincides with 
Rothe and Muzzatti’s sociological perspective on the 9/11 societal response.  This also is the 
case for most literature regarding the media and terrorism.  Norris, Kern, and Just (2003) focus 
on the media response to 9/11 and claim the media ―influence[s] the public’s understanding of 
terrorism and its threats‖ (2003:7) and ―alter[s] the perceptions of risk at home and abroad‖ 
(2004: 4).  Practically all current research argues media’s response to 9/11 overdramatized the 
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problem.  The data I collected on the information flow during the ten years before and after 9/11 
present trends that provide evidenced that refutes this belief.  Currently, the limited sociological 
research that exists in regards to terrorism appears to mirror the fundamental ideas that the moral 
panic theory proposes.  Whether the moral panic theory is specifically applied or not it is evident 
sociological literature unanimously agrees the 9/11 societal response was excessive and 
exploitative.   
The moral panic theory and Rothe and Muzzatti’s application is described in greater 
detail throughout my study and is compared to my own theory, the normative tragedy actuated 
response which refutes the mainstream opinions and claims the 9/11 response was both 
appropriate and necessary.  The normative tragedy actuated response is based on the same three 
social forces as the moral panic theory; 1) the media response, 2) public fear, and 3) agents of 
social control. However, in regards to social control agents, the moral panic theory takes a broad 
approach, while my theory focuses on the FBI organizational development.  The normative 
tragedy actuated response argues why the 9/11 societal response is a poor application of the 
moral panic theory, while also establishing a more accurate and comprehensive theoretical 
perspective.  My theory is an original perspective on the 9/11 societal response and contradicts 
the present literature.  Although in this case the normative tragedy actuated response is applied to 
terrorism, the fundamental concepts are structured in a way that enables for various other 
applications.  Overall, more research, sociological or not, is still needed in regards to the societal 
response.  This phenomenon is still under-researched and needs to be looked at more closely 
from various other perspectives.  The next chapter meticulously characterizes the FBI 
organizational development, according to the United States Department of Justice and the United 
States Governmental Accountability Office.   
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Chapter 3: FBI Organizational Development 
The years leading up to the terrorist attacks in 2001 presented an increased concern 
regarding terrorism.  Terrorist activity across the world became more prevalent throughout the 
1990s. The 1993 World Trade Center bombing,1995 Oklahoma City bombing, 1996 Summer 
Olympics bombing, and 1998 United States Embassy bombings are a few of the most significant 
terrorist attacks on the United States during this time.  The FBI became more concerned with this 
issue; however, it took very little action to address the problem. It was not until the 1998 FBI 
Strategic Plan when official steps were outlined to improve defense against terrorist attacks.  The 
1998 Strategic Plan ―set agenda for the Bureau by establishing specific strategic goals and broad 
strategies for achieving those goals‖(United States Department of Justice [DOJ] 2003:8).  This 
plan clearly outlined FBI priorities by establishing a three tier system.  FBI programs were 
categorized in these tiers according to their importance; tier one being the most important and 
tier three being the least
1
.  This plan was intended to systematically prioritize FBI activity and 
create a more efficient and effective agency (DOJ 2003:8).  According to Zegart,  ―By 1998, a 
handful of senior FBI officials were desperately trying to transform the bureau into a twenty-first 
century  counterterrorism agency, with the technological capabilities, analytic capacity, and 
proactive mentality to thwart attacks before they occurred‖ (2007: 127).  By 1999, the FBI 
established the Counterterrorism Division as an independent division rather than being a 
component of the National Security Division, as it was since its inception in 1996. The FBI 
employed these reform initiatives in an attempt to ―enhance the FBI’s counterterrorism capacity‖ 
(Zegart 2007:127), and strengthen counterterrorism focus.  Despite these new reform initiatives 
the FBI failed to execute the objectives.  Resource usage by the end of 2001 was significantly 
                                                          
1
 The 1998 Strategic Plan is examined in greater detail later in this chapter. 
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dissimilar than the 1998 Strategic Plan priorities, as is discussed later in this chapter.  The FBI 
continued to emphasize its focus on traditional criminal work
2
 as they had done for the past thirty 
years.  In fact, the FBI did not endorse terrorism matters as the top priority until after the 2001 
terrorist attacks, despite the three tier priority system outlined in the 1998 strategic plan.  
Resource allocation and utilization data provided by the Department of Justice study further 
characterizes the Bureau’s organizational objectives during the years before and after 9/11. This 
section analyzes the FBI organizational development post 9/11 in great detail and is used to 
support the theoretical perspective discussed in chapter five regarding the 9/11 societal response.  
The following data evaluates the FBI’s pattern in allocating and utilizing resources during the 
five years prior to 9/11 and the eight years after (1996 to 2009).  With these data, this section 
characterizes the transformation effectively employed by the FBI in the years after the 9/11, 
which I argue ultimately served as means of reducing public fear.    The following data shows, 
while criminal enterprise
3
 matters predominately consumed resources prior to 9/11; national 
security matters now largely occupy FBI resources.     
The data presented throughout the rest of this chapter is unique to the FBI.  The 
Department of Justice along with the Government Accountability Office collected this specific 
data in order to directly present the ways in which the FBI is allocating and utilizing resources 
within the agency.  Resource allocation and utilization data is derived through Funded Staffing 
Levels (FSL) and Average on Board (AOB) respectively.   Human Resources are allocated 
                                                          
2
 Traditional criminal work included the priorities that predominately occupied FBI resources for the past thirty 
years.  For example, white collar crime, violent crime, organized crime, civil rights, ect.   
3
 The Federal Bureau of Investigation classifies all investigative matters into to main categories: 1. Criminal 
Enterprise, and 2. National Security.  Within each category there are numerous sub-categories.  Criminal Enterprise 
matters include public corruption, civil rights, organized crime, white collar crime, and violent crime. National 
Security matters include terrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber crime.  In interest of clarity, criminal enterprise 
matters refer to the formerly listed crimes and national security matters refers to the latter.    
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according to the program’s established FSL.  The FSL for each FBI program is determined by 
the Resource Management and Allocation Office.  Headquarter Managers for each FBI program 
submits a yearly resource request, which is then reviewed by the Finance Office to ensure the 
request is sufficiently justified.  These requests are then submitted to the Department of Justice 
Management Division.  Once requests are approved the FBI Resource Management and 
Allocation Office sets the FSL for each program (DOJ 2003: 9). Funded Staffing Levels equates 
to one funded employee, or one full time equivalent (DOJ 2010: 2).  It should be noted, that 
headquarters’ personnel, supervisory personnel, and support personnel are not included in the 
FSL.  FSLs only reflect non-supervisory agents in the field offices.  FSL for support personnel
4
 
is, indeed, established; however, it is allocated to the field offices in a lump sum and is not 
consistently recorded by each program (DOJ 2010: 2). With that said, any reference to FSL 
strictly regards non-supervisory special agents. Regardless, the FSL is a direct reflection of how 
the FBI allocates agent resources, which, in turn, communicates, in the Bureau’s opinion, how 
resources should ideally be used within the agency.  
However, actual agent utilization sometimes deviates from the established FSL.  Actual 
agent utilization is determined by the Average On-Board.  AOB is tracked through the FBI Time 
Utilization and Recordkeeping (TURK) system.  Agents record the percentage of their time 
working in specific investigative classifications (DOJ 2003: 9).  For example, if an agent spends 
half the day working on a bank robbery case and the other half on a fraud case, the agent records 
50% of time in Violent Crime and 50% in White Collar Crime.  Like FSL, AOB equates to one 
agent which ―refers to either: 1) one full time agent working solely in a single investigative area, 
                                                          
4
 Field Offices are not required to report program FSL for support personnel to headquarters, and data is 
inconsistently available. Data for total human resources (special agents plus support personnel) is infrequently 
used throughout this chapter and is not the same as the predominating FSL data.  
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or 2) multiple agents working part-time on the same investigation‖ (DOJ 2010: 3).  The AOB 
data reflects where agents are actually being used and is a concrete depiction of actual FBI 
activity.  
According to the FBI, when FSL (allocated resources) exceeds AOB (utilized resources) 
an underburn occurs. When AOB exceed FSL an overburn occurs. Throughout this section, when 
referring to an underburn more agent resources were allocated to that specific program then were 
actually utilized. Conversely, when referring to an overburn, fewer agent resources were 
allocated to that specific program than were actually utilized.     
In addition to resource allocation and utilization data, the post 9/11 organizational 
development is also depicted through FBI casework levels. The Automated Case Support (ACS) 
system maintains detailed information on all FBI cases. Using the ACS the Department of 
Justice examined the ―number and types of cases the FBI investigated both before and after 
9/11‖ (DOJ 2003: 11). 
These data are presented throughout the rest of this chapter to depict the transformation 
initiated by the 9/11 attacks.  FSL, AOB, and casework data empirically illustrates the FBI’s shift 
from criminal enterprise matters to primarily national security issues.   
Pre-9/11: 1996 to 2001  
As previously discussed, the FBI allocates human resources for each program 
systematically through the Funded Staffing Levels (FSL).  Funded Staffing Levels for the 
National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) and National Infrastructure Protection and 
Computer Intrusion Program (NIPCIP) are redacted by the Department of Justice, however, the 
average FSL for Domestic Terrorism (DT) between 1996 and 2001 was 1,542 less than that of 
the program with the next highest FSL, Violent Crime and Major Offender (VCMO) (DOJ 2003: 
20 
 
30).  White Collar Crime Program (WCCP) sustained the highest average FSL between 1996 and 
2001, which was over five and half times that of DT (2003:30).   WCCP was followed by 
Organized Crime/Drug Program (OCDP) and VCMO (2,407).  Little focus was put on domestic 
terrorism related efforts; despite several attacks throughout the 1990s, in addition to the fact that 
the 1998 Strategic Plan categorized DT as a tier one priority.  The FBI was undoubtedly more 
concerned with criminal enterprise in the five years prior to the 9/11 attacks than it was with 
terrorism.  Although FSL does not reflect the actual utilized personnel resources, resource 
utilization data, AOB, also further emphasized the negligent attitude toward terrorism related 
matters.   
Using the TURK system the Department of Justice calculates the actual agent utilization 
or Average On Board (AOB).  The AOB is a direct reflection of the agent resources used in a 
particular program.  DT consistently under utilized FSLs between 1996 and 2001.  According to 
the U.S. Department of Justice, the ―FBI diverted resources from DT to the Safe Streets Task 
Force‖ (2003:35).  In part, this contributed to the ―overburn‖ in the VCMO program.  According 
to FBI officials, large focus was put on reducing gun violence and illegal drug trafficking 
between 1996 and 2001 which is why both NFIP and NICIP largely under utilized agent 
resources during this time (DOJ 2003: 35).  The FBI utilized most human resources
5
 towards the 
White Collar Crime Program (WCCP). Between fiscal year 1996 to 2001 the FBI used an 
average of 2,591 human resources towards WCCP; however, WCCP was only considered a tier 
two priority. Although exact numbers are redacted, human resource utilization for WCCP far 
exceeded DT, NIPCIP, and NFIP, which were all categorized as tier one priorities (2003:15). 
                                                          
5
 United States Department of Justice defines human resources as the total number of FBI special agents (non-
supervisory) and support personnel allocated toward a specific program. 
21 
 
The top four human resource usage programs included WCCP, NFIP, OCDP, and VCMO
 6
.  
NFIP was the only top four resource usage program listed as a tier one program
7
.  OCDP was in 
tier two and VCMO in tier three, yet both utilized over 500 more special agents then did NFIP 
between fiscal year 1996 and 2001.  This data shows the vast misalignment between the strategic 
priorities and actual FBI activity between 1996 and 2001 (DOJ 2003:16). The increased terrorist 
activity did in fact raise concern for FBI officials, as evidence of the strategic plan; however, it 
did not establish a change in FBI activity. A U.S. Department of Justice report states, ―Although 
the FBI stated that its top priority was terrorism related work, the FBI utilized more of its agent 
resources in traditional criminal investigative areas, such as white-collar crime, violent crime, 
and organized crime/drugs than in terrorism programs‖ (DOJ 2004: 3). By purposely reducing 
national security resources and increasing criminal enterprise resources the FBI effectively 
communicated the areas that they perceived posed the greatest threat.  According to Theoharis 
(1999), the 1970s and 1980s presented white-collar crime, violent crime, and organized crime as 
a serious threat that occupied many FBI resources.  Likewise, these data shows criminal 
enterprise matters continued to preoccupy FBI activity through 2001, in turn, this distracted the 
agency from the alarmingly increased terrorism threat.  The FBI did not experience an 
organizational transformation towards national security until the years following the 9/11 attacks, 
as the Department of Justice and Government Accountability Office reveal in their later studies.  
 
 
                                                          
6
 Each of the top four highest human resource usage programs utilized 1400 more human resources than any other 
program, thus this study primarily focuses on these FBI programs  
7
 NFIP utilized the second highest total number of human resources despite utilizing over five-hundred fewer 
agents than any of the other three top four programs, due to the large number of utilized support personnel.  NFIP 
utilized the highest number of support personnel out of any FBI program. 
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Post 9/11: 2001 to 2009          
In response to the Al Qaeda attacks on September 11, 2001 the FBI experienced an 
immediate organizational development which is indicative of the attempts to diminish public 
fear.  The 9/11 attack killed almost 3,000 people and undoubtedly is the worst terrorist attack in 
United States history.  Prior to 9/11 the FBI put its main focus on criminal enterprises, more 
specifically white collar crime, violent crime, and organized/drug crime.  However, in the wake 
of 9/11 this focus immediately shifted toward national security threats.  In the months following 
9/11 the FBI redirected a significant amount of resources toward terrorism matters.  The resource 
utilization, AOB, levels for terrorism related matters did subside after the initial response (first 
eight months); however, they did not return, and still have not returned, to pre-9/11 levels.  The 
previous data revealed resources were mostly applied toward criminal enterprises during the late 
1990s; however, after 9/11 the FBI employed the opposite.  As the FBI began reallocating 
resources a tremendous organizational transformation ensued.  The following data provided by 
the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Government Accountability Office empirically 
reveals this transformation.  
 In the first eight months after the 9/11 attacks an initial response occurred within the FBI.  
This response was characterized by a tremendous shift in resource utilization. In the months 
following the 9/11 attacks the percentage of agents increased for NFIP and DT, but decreased for 
all other programs. Agents working NFIP almost tripled, increasing 31%, and total utilized 
human resources increase 26%. By June of 2002, 56% of FBI human resources were assigned to 
terrorism related matters. Human resources were redirected from other programs. The programs 
which experience the greatest reductions included WCCP, OCDP, and VCMO experienced the 
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greatest reduction in human resources
8
, 8%, 9%, and 9% respectively (DOJ 2003: 26).  A large 
portion of resources were diverted from the drug component of OCDP, which experienced a 45% 
reduction in allocated agents
9
. Drug investigations accounted for 890 special agent positions 
prior to 9/11.  After the attacks, 400 of these agents were transferred to terrorism related matters. 
By June of 2002, terrorism related matters experienced an increase in 685 agents and non-
terrorism matters decreased by 547 agents (DOJ 2003: 26). Figure 1 shows the change (in the 
first eight months) in utilized personnel in each major FBI program.  
Figure 1: 
 
These initial changes were not a permanent organizational transformation, but rather a temporary 
response to the 9/11 attacks.  Allocating 56% of human resources to terrorism related matters is 
                                                          
8
 It must be noted that this is the reduction in human resources (special agents plus support personnel), therefore, 
larger reductions for these programs are presented later in this chapter regarding FSL and AOB which only include 
non-supervisory special agents. 
9
 Drug matters experienced the greatest reduction in agents due to concurrent jurisdiction with the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA).  The DEA was able to increase personnel in order to compensate for FBI 
reductions 
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unsustainable in an organization like the FBI, due to the vast jurisdiction for which the agency is 
responsible.  As the initial response subsided during the latter half of 2002 some resources were 
soon diverted back to non-terrorism matters; however, pre-9/11 levels were never restored.  The 
next two years sustained a lower level of resources allocated to terrorism initiatives compared to 
the initial 18 months; however, it was still significantly higher then the pre 9/11 levels.  This 
initial response was the beginning of a organizational FBI transformation. The data presented 
throughout the rest of this chapter reflects the organization transformation made within the FBI 
form 2001 to 2003.   
 The FBI transformation is characterized as a ―reorganization and reprioritization‖ (DOJ 
2004: 1).  Although the reorganization aspect of this transformation maintains an essential 
component in the post 9/11 FBI organizational development, in the interest of this study only the 
reprioritization aspect is presented here.  The FBI reprioritization, triggered by the 9/11 attacks, 
played an essential role in transforming the Bureau into an intelligence focused agency.  The 
reprioritization refocused FBI efforts to primarily address national security concerns. With that, 
FBI operations largely strayed away from traditional criminal enterprise matters.   The FBI 
officially employed its reprioritization upon Director Robert Muller’s announcement in 2002.  
As discussed previously, prior to 9/11 FBI priorities were outlined in the three tier system of the 
1998 Strategic Plan.  By June of 2002, in response to the 2001 terrorist attacks, FBI director 
Robert Muller announced a new priority list
10
.  Rather then establishing only three general levels 
of importance as the tier system did, Director Muller specified the importance of each individual 
                                                          
10
 The new (2002) priority list re-titled the three National Security priorities; however, in interest of uniformity and 
clarity this study uses the old category titles. The old category titles are referenced proceeding the new category 
title in the 2002 priority list, indicated by a (*).   
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program by creating a ten item list, one being the most important and ten being the least. The ten 
categories are as follows: 
National Security: 
1.  Terrorism *(DT)  
2.  Foreign Counterintelligence *(NFIP) 
3.  Cyber Crime *(NIPCIP) 
 
Criminal Enterprise: 
4.  Public Corruption  
5.  Civil Rights  
6.  Organized Crime and Drugs 
7.  White Collar Crime 
8.  Violent Crime/Major Offenders 
9.  Support Federal, State, county, municipal, and international partners 
10.  Upgrade technology (fbi.gov) 
 
Although, the 2002 priority list did not vary significantly from the 1998 Strategic Plan priority 
list, it clearly specifies the importance of each program as opposed to grouping the programs into 
three general tiers.  With that, the FBI was able to better focus their operations, in turn; FBI 
activity now coincides with the outlined priorities more accurately than it did prior to Director 
Muller’s announcement.  The following data collected in a 2004 U.S. Department of Justice 
study characterizes the reprioritization.    
The most drastic changes made throughout the course of the transformation occurred 
during the initial three years of the reprioritization, 2001 to 2003.  Before the shift in priorities, 
WCCP maintained the largest number of allocated agent positions as it had done throughout the 
1990s and even into the first two years of the twenty-first century. However, by the end of 2003, 
a year and a half after the official priority shift, terrorism related matters (NFIP, DT, and 
NIPCIP) comprised the ―largest concentration of FBI resources‖ (Government Accountability 
Office [GAO] 2004: 5). Figure 2 shows the percentage of total FBI Funded Staffing Levels for 
various FBI programs.    
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Figure 2: 
 
(GAO 2004: 6) 
As Figure 2 shows, FSL for terrorism related programs comprised 33% of the total FBI FSL by 
2003 surpassing WCCP (Government Accountability Office [GAO] 2004:6).  Prior to 9/11 
terrorism was only 6% of the total FBI FSL (Zegart 2007: 128). The initial priority shift had a 
significant impact on almost all FBI programs. By the end of 2003 the FBI employed significant 
changes in regards to resource allocation and utilization.  The FSLs in 2003 compared to FSLs in 
2000, indicates non-terrorism FSLs decreased 14.5%, while terrorism related FSLs increased 
25.5% during this same time period (DOJ: 2004:6).  Figure 3 shows the 2000 and 2003 FSL for 
each major program.   As seen in the graph, VCMO experienced the largest reduction in FSL 
(50%), followed by OCDP (33%), and WCCP (6%) (DOJ 2004:7). Although the VCMO FSL 
experienced the largest reduction, it was, in fact, OCDP that experienced the largest reductions in 
actual agent utilization, AOB.  OCDP experienced a 44% decrease in AOB between 2000 and 
2003.  In 2000, when organized crime and drug operations occupied a significant amount of FBI 
resources, this program experienced an overburn of 2.7%.  Three years later, proceeding the 9/11 
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attacks, OCDP had a 14% underburn (DOJ 2004:37).  VCMOP and WCCP also experienced a 
significant reduction in AOB during the same period, although not as large as OCDP. 
Figure 3: 
 
(DOJ 2004: 35) 
In 2000 VCMOP had a 2.5% overburn and by 2003 it sustained a 16% underburn, resulting in a 
30% decrease in AOB (DOJ 2004:39).  WCCP successfully endured the reprioritization through 
2003 with a relatively small AOB reduction, 21.5%. Figure 3 also shows the reduction in the 
drug component of OCDP; the sub-program that experienced the largest decline in resources 
throughout the reprioritization.  The FSLs for drug matters reduced 62% compared to pre-9/11 
levels (DOJ 2004: 7).   After 9/11 it is apparent the FBI allocated its resources much differently 
from pre-9/11.  Despite the significant reduction in resources allocated to criminal enterprise 
matters, the Bureau under utilized resources for these programs. In 2003, the AOB for non-
terrorism matters was 879 less then the FSL.  This under utilization is a result of the significant 
over utilization in terrorism related programs. Due to classified information, individual FSLs for 
NFIP and NIPCIP are redacted by the Department of Justice; however, the combined FSL 
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increased 27%.  Likewise, DT’s FSL increased 15% during the same time period (DOJ 2004:7).  
Regardless of the large increases, national security programs still experienced an 845 agent 
overburn, due to the large increase in agent utilization between 2000 and 2003.  Once again exact 
AOB numbers are redacted by the U.S. Department of Justice.  By the end of 2003, terrorism 
related matters were undoubtedly the FBI’s primary focus.  All three national security programs 
increased FSLs yet still over utilized resources.  On the contrary, the FSL for all three major 
criminal enterprise programs decreased yet still experienced an under utilization.   
Furthermore, the FBI’s reprioritization impacted the program case levels. In 2003 the FBI 
opened 9,632 more terrorism related cases than it did in 2000 (DOJ 2004:17).  After 9/11 the FBI 
became concerned with national security threats and began opening cases which previously 
never even led to a preliminary investigation.  To increase national security the FBI followed up 
on leads indiscriminately, investigating any potential threats no matter how insignificant.  Figure 
4 shows the change in the number of opened cases during 2000 and 2003 for terrorism and non-
terrorism matters.  Compared to Fiscal Year 2000, in 2003 the FBI increased the number of 
terrorism related cases it opened by more than 60%, and reduced the number of non-terrorism 
cases by 37% (DOJ 2004:17).  
Figure 5 shows the changes in opened cases for each individual FBI programs.  Again 
OCDP experienced the highest decrease in opened cases. Fifty percent fewer OCDP cases were 
opened in 2003 than in 2000. VCMOP shortly followed with 40% fewer cases, and then WCCP 
with 25%.  Terrorism related programs experience the opposite change.  In 2003 NFIP opened 
70% more case than in 2000.  Likewise, DT experienced a 51% increase in opened cases (DOJ 
2004:25).  
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Figure 4: 
 
(DOJ 2004: 17) 
Figure 5: 
 
(DOJ 2004:25) 
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 The pervious data presents the intial three years of the reprioritization within the FBI.  
Most resources were redirected from the OCDP, specifically the drug component of OCDP. 
Conversely, NFIP experienced the greatest increase in resources during the three years following 
the attacks.  The 9/11 attacks effectively initiated the largest transformation in FBI history.  This 
organizational development, specifically the reprioritaization, continued through the end of the 
decade and national security related matters increasingly occupied FBI resources.  Although 
significantly fewer changes were made from 2003 to 2009, the Bureau’s organizational 
development did produce additional adjustments, as the 2010 Department of Justice study 
discloses.  
As the previous data represented, the initial reprioritization produced the greatest amount 
of change throughout the post 9/11 organizational development.  During the years following the 
initial three year transformation, the FBI did employ further changes, however, nothing as 
drastic.  A large portion of 2009  data is redacted by the Department of Justice, especially in 
regards to terrorism matters, therefore, criminal enterprise data is predominately used to protray 
any further FBI changes.   
Figure 6 shows the FSL for criminal enterprise matters in 2009 compared to that of  2003 
and 2000.  In 2009, WCCP FSL decreased 12.5% from 2003.  Although the 2009  FSL for 
VCMO did not decreased as much, 9%, it did experience a much larger overall reduction. The 
FSL for VCMO decreased 53% from the year prior to 9/11, while WCCP only decreased 18% 
(DOJ 2010: 50-57)  The 2009 OCDP FSL is redacted, therefore the level of change is unknown 
for this program, however, given OCDP generally experienced the largest reduction, the 2009 
FSL presumably experience similar declines.  FBI officals stated the decline in criminal 
enterprise FSL is most likely due to the increase in terrorist threat during 2006.  As the FBI faced 
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more terrorism threats more resources were allocated toward national security programs like 
NFIP, NIPCIP, and DT.  
Figure 6: 
 
(DOJ 2004: 35; DOJ 2010: 50-57) 
 
Although the FBI decreased resource allocation toward criminal enterprise matters, an 
increase in resource utilization existed between 2003 and 2009.  As seen in Figure 7, all three 
criminal enterprise matters maintained a larger AOB in 2009 compared to 2003.  The OCDP 
AOB increased 24%, the largest of the three; however, VCMO shortly followed (14%) (DOJ 
2010: 50-58).  This is in part because the FBI increased efforts to disrupt and avert street gang 
activity in fear of cooperation with known terrorist groups.  VCMO and OCDP experienced a 
tremendous reduction during the intial three years which left these programs with insufficient 
resources.  With that, effectively enforcing violent crime and organized crime was an 
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unecessarily difficult task.  The Bureau, in turn, redirected resources back to these  programs to 
correct the inappropriate resource usage.  Despite the AOB increases, VCMO still experienced a 
20% overall reduction from 2000.  OCDP experienced the largest overall reduction, 31%, 
followed by WCCP which declined 22% from 2000 (DOJ 2010: 50-57).  FBI officials believed 
OCDP experienced the largest overall decline, not because organized/drug crime was less 
important, but rather because another agency, the Drug Enforcement Agency, maintained 
jurisdiction concurrent to the FBI drug program. Throughout the FBI post 9/11 organizational 
development resources were predominately taken from the drug component of OCDP.  By 2009 
the Drug Enforcment Agency assumed almost all responsiblity for drug operations.   
Figure 7: 
 
(DOJ 2004: 39; DOJ 2010: 52-57)  
Although exact numbers regrading NFIP, NIPCIP, and DT resource allocation and 
utilization are unavailable due to redacted data, it is no doubt these programs continued to 
consume the majority of FBI resources through 2009.  While analyzing case levels for each FBI 
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program, it is evident national security concerns attracted much more attention than it did in the 
years prior to 9/11.  Figure 8 compares case levels in 2009 to the case levels in 2000 and 2003 
for each FBI program. Surprisingly, no criminal enterprise FBI program expereinced a 
significant reduction in case levels from 2003.  As Figure 9 shows WCCP remained the same 
and both VCMO (13%) and OCDP (68%) actually increased from 2003 (DOJ 2010: 50-57).  
Senior FBI officials in the Criminal Investigative Division claim the large increase in case levels 
for these programs was a result of the tremendous reductionsVCMO and OCDP experienced in 
the first three years after 9/11.  More investigations needed to be opened in these areas in order 
to effectively address the pressing issues, however, pre-9/11 case levels were never completely 
restored.  Regardless of these increased case levels from 2003, all criminal enterprise programs, 
VCMO, WCCP, and OCDP, still experienced an significant overall reduction, 33%, 28%, and 
18% respectively.  However, the most noteable finding in Figure 8, is the substantial NIPCIP 
increase.  The 2009 NIPCIP case levels were almost nine and half times greater than that of 
2003.  In 2003 there were only 1,050 active cases, by 2009 this increased to 9,968.  FBI officials 
claim this increase was mainly due to the rise in cyber crime and computer intrusion.  A cyber 
crime program was created after 9/11 in order to better address these issues.  In addition, FBI 
officials also believe this large NIPCIP increase resulted because the program largely went 
unchanged during the initial transformation.  In the two years after 9/11 the FBI predominately 
focused resources toward DT and NFIP.  Data presented earlier in this chapter shows NIPCIP did 
not experience a significant rise in neither FSL, AOB, nor case levels.  Although 2009 data for 
NFIP are redacted, Figure 8 shows DT did not experience any significant change in case levels 
from 2003, regardless, overall DT case levels still maintained a 55% increased from the year 
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before 9/11.  These data indicate, while DT and NFIP experienced its transformation between 
2001 and 2003, NIPCIP did not do so until later between 2003 and 2009. 
Figure 8:    
 
(DOJ 2004:25; DOJ 2010: 52-57) 
The FBI is evidently structured much different now than any time prior to 9/11.  The new Bureau 
is now oriented towards prevention efforts as opposed to the traditional reactive approach.  As 
the data presented throughout this chapter reveals the FBI, while still maintaining traditional 
criminal investigative efforts,  is primarily focused on national security threats. A senior FBI 
official stated, ―The FBI used more human resources to address counterterrorism matters than on 
any other investigative area since 9/11‖ (DOJ 2010:9).   Although this study only examines data 
up until 2009, the FBI continues its work to secure and protect the nation from terrorist attacks 
and assumingly will evolve with the criminal environment, as the Bureau has done since its 
inception in 1908.  The previous data characterizes the FBI organizational development post 9/11 
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and supports the theortical perspective regarding the formal social control agents response to 
9/11, which is discussed in greater detail in the coming chapters.  
Chapter 4: Data Collection 
Methods 
The data discussed in the previous chapter illustrates the FBI response to 9/11 and depicts 
the role of the agents of social control.  The data discussed in this chapter depicts the news media 
responses to 9/11.  This study originated from the need to characterize the FBI post 9/11 
organizational development.  After reviewing data collected by the United States Department of 
Justice (presented in chapter three) this study evolved into an analysis of the complex 9/11 
societal response.  With that, the need to examine additional social forces within the 9/11 context 
became prevalent; as a result, the news media were identified at the forefront of the response.  A 
more in depth analysis was necessary to comprehensively understand the news media response; 
thus, this study illustrates the response by systematically measuring the information flow levels 
following 9/11.  
This study measures the information flow during the ten years before and after 9/11.  
Information flow is defined as the dissemination and presentation of facts or descriptions of the 
events surround the attacks, as well as various other journalistic materials.   Information flow 
was quantified by the number of newspaper articles related to terrorism published between 1991 
and 2011. The years spanning January 1, 1991, to September 10, 2001, served as a baseline 
comparison to the test variable, September 11, 2001, to December 31, 2011.  These two time 
periods were classified as ―Pre 9/11‖ and ―Post 9/11‖ respectfully.  Data were collected on a total 
of twenty newspapers, which were selected based on the United States Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) terrorism risk evaluation system. DHS established a two tier system for 
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evaluating the current terrorism risk in each major U.S. city, tier one being the cities with the 
highest risk and tier two being all other cities.  The DHS categorization method and criteria is 
unknown.   In the interest of clarity, this study refers to tier one as High Risk Cities (HRC) and 
tier two as Low Risk Cities (LRC).  HRC include New York, Washington D.C., Boston, Newark, 
Philadelphia, Chicago, Dallas, Houston, Los Angeles, and San Francisco.  Since DHS bundles all 
other U.S. cities not included in tier one in one category, I systematically chose the next ten 
largest cities by population to represent the LRC.  LRC include Phoenix, San Antonio, San 
Diego, San Jose, Jacksonville, Indianapolis, Austin, Columbus, Charlotte, and Detroit.  The 
twenty cities in this study essential were the largest U.S. cities by population, with the exception 
of Boston and Washington D.C., which rank just outside the top twenty.  Next, the most popular 
newspaper in each city, according to total number of subscribers, was used for the article search.  
The twenty newspapers used included New York Times, Washington Post, Boston Globe, 
Newark Star Ledger, Philadelphia Inquirer, Chicago Tribune, Dallas Morning News, Houston 
Chronicle, Los Angeles Times, San Francisco Chronicle, Arizona Republic, San Antonio 
Express News, San Diego Union Tribune, San Jose Mercury News, Florida Times-Union, 
Indianapolis Star, Austin American Statesmen, Columbus Dispatch, Charlotte Observer, and 
Detroit Free Press.  For all twenty newspapers a search was conducted for terrorism related 
articles published each year from 1991 to 2011.  The year 2001 was divided into pre 9/11 
(01/01/2001 - 09/10/2001) and post 9/11 (09/11/2001 – 12/31/2001).  This was done in order to 
more accurately depict the difference in information flow before and after the attacks.  The 
search was conducted in ProQuest newspaper database system, using search terms ―terrorism* 
OR terrorist*‖.  ProQuest did not encompass all newspapers used in this study; therefore, for 
those excluded in ProQuest the search was completed using the archive records on the respective 
37 
 
newspaper website.  The same search terms, ―terrorism* OR terrorist*‖ was used identical to the 
ProQuest search.  The newspapers not used in ProQuest are identified by an asterisk (*) next to 
the newspaper title in the data chart.  Furthermore, data for the Charlotte Observer were not 
found in ProQuest or the archive records on its home website.  The search for this newspaper 
was conducted courtesy of the Charlotte Observer librarian, whom also used identical search 
criteria and procedure within a private database system. Unfortunately, after the article search for 
all twenty newspapers was complete there was some missing data for several newspapers.  The 
absent data are indicated by a ―NF‖ (Not Found) in the excel spreadsheet.  All results for the 
article searches were input into an excel spreadsheet and then statistically analyzed.   
The data was analyzed using IBM Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS).  
The ultimate objective of this statistical analysis was to find any variations between various 
variables.  T-tests were used to analyze the data, more specifically Paired Samples T-tests and 
Independent Sample T-tests.  The T-test application in SPSS measures the variation between 
variables and determines the level of significance.  First, the numbers of articles, frequencies, 
were converted into a percentage, which was done in order to compensate for any variation in the 
newspaper’s size (i.e. number of subscribers).  For each year, 1991 to 2011, the percent of that 
particular newspapers’ total number of published articles was calculated.  For example in 1991 
the New York Times published 1200 terrorism related articles and the total number of articles 
published by the New York Times was 60,804.  Therefore 1.97% of New York Times terrorism 
articles were published in 1991.  In general the HRC had a larger population than LRC; in turn, 
those newspapers also had more subscribers.  Using the frequency means in the data analyses 
would not only reflective the differences in information flow, but also the variation in the 
newspapers’ size.  This factor was effectively eliminated by using the percent means. 
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The main variable, city risk level was then tested.  Using a paired samples t-test, the 
overall variation between HRC percent means and LRC percent means was measured.  Next, the 
city risk level variable was manipulated by analyzing the various time periods, time period.  The 
variation between HRC percent means post 9/11 and LRC percent means post 9/11 was 
measured, again using a paired samples t-test.  In order to better compare the risk levels three 
and five year analyses were conducted.  An independent samples t-test was used to examine the 
difference in the initial 40 months (three years and four months) after the attacks (2001 post 
9/11– 2004) between HRC and LRC.  The same was done for the time periods of the first 64 
months (five years and four months), last 60 months (five years), and last 36 months (three 
years). This manipulation procedure was repeated for three additional variables, impact, political 
orientation, and proximity. 
First, all twenty newspaper were reorganized and manipulated according to the political 
orientation, liberal or conservative.  The political orientation was determined based off of which 
2000 Presidential candidate the respective newspaper endorsed.  For example in 2000 the New 
York Times endorsed the Democratic candidate, Al Gore, therefore the New York Times was 
categorized as liberal.  The Liberal newspapers included New York Times, Washington Post, 
Philadelphia Inquirer, San Francisco Chronicle, Newark Star Ledger, Boston Globe, San Jose 
Mercury News, Charlotte Observer, and Detroit Free Press.  The Conservative newspapers 
included Columbus Dispatch, Austin American Statesman, Indianapolis Star, Florida Times-
Union, San Antonio Express, Arizona Republic, Huston Chronicle, Dallas Morning News, 
Chicago Tribune, and San Diego Union Tribune.  Los Angeles times did not endorse either 
candidate in the 2000 presidential election, therefore, it was left out of this analysis.   
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Second, the newspapers were again reorganized and manipulated, this time according to 
whether or not the city in which the newspaper was located was immediately impacted by the 
physical damage of the attacks.  The impacted newspapers included the New York Times and 
Washington Post, while the non-impacted newspapers included all the others.  
Finally, the newspapers were reorganized and manipulated one last time according to 
proximity.  The newspapers were organized into the four main geographic regions established by 
the United States Census Bureau, West (Los Angeles Times, San Francisco Chronicle, Arizona 
Republic, San Diego Union Tribune, and San Jose Mercury News), Midwest (Chicago Tribune, 
Indianapolis Star, Columbus Dispatch, and Detroit Free Press), South (Washington Post, Dallas 
Morning News, Houston Chronicle, San Antonio Express News, Florida Times-Union, Austin 
American Statesmen, and Charlotte Observer), and Northeast (New York Times, Boston Globe, 
Newark Star Ledger, and Philadelphia Inquirer).  The three and five year manipulations 
conducted on the main variable, risk level, were also conducted on the proximity, impact, and 
political orientation variables using a paired samples t-test. 
Additionally, in order to examine the news media response and the information flow 
changes in greater detail five year and three year analyses were conducted within the two risk 
level categories.   For both HRC and LRC an independent samples t-test was used to examine the 
variation in information flow between the pre 9/11 and post 9/11 period.  Likewise, in order to 
more accurately depict the increased information flow after the attacks, the previous five years 
(1996-2000) was compared to the first five years (2002-2006) in both HRC and LRC.  Next, in 
order to depict how long the increased information flow was sustained for, the first five years 
(2002-2006) was compared to the last five years (2007-2011) again in both HRC and LRC.  This 
same procedure was conducted on the first three years (2002-2004) and the last three years 
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(2009-2011). Lastly, in order to determine if information flow had returned to pre 9/11 levels, the 
previous five years (1996-2000) was compared to the last five years (2007-2011) in both HRC 
and LRC.  It must be noted that the four month period in 2001 after 9/11 (09/11/2001 to 
12/31/2001) was not used in these particular data analyses in order to make the degrees of 
freedom for the two test variables equivalent.  Using an equal time period for each variable 
enables for more accurate findings. 
It is imperative to know this study was not a content analysis on terrorism articles and no 
coding was conducted in this search.  This search was strictly focused on illustrating the news 
media post 9/11 response in regards to information flow.  Various variables were manipulated in 
order to accurately portray all aspects of the media response. The results are reported in the next 
section which empirically supports the normative tragedy actuated response and rejects the moral 
panic theory. 
Results 
 Figure 9-1 and Figure 9-2 show the frequencies derived from the newspaper article 
search.  Figure 9-1 is the number of terrorism related articles published in high risk cities from 
1991 to 2001, while Figure 9-2 is that of low risk cities during the same time period.  These 
frequencies were converted into percentages of the total number of articles published within each 
newspaper.  Figure 10-1 shows the high risk percents and Figure 10-2 shows the low risk 
percents. With closer examination, overall 2001 (not including the eight months prior to the 
attacks) maintained the most terrorism related publications.  There were only five newspapers in 
which 2001 (post 9/11) did not have the most publications, these newspapers included:  
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Figure 9-1: The number of terrorism related articles published each year by newspapers located in high risk cities11. 
Year 
High Risk City Newspapers: Number of Terrorism Related Articles Published (1991-2011) 
NYT WP *DMN LAT HC CT PI SFC *NSL BG 
1991 1200 923 561 1551 893 849 636 836 320 511 
1992 882 634 475 909 598 665 443 540 290 345 
1994 917 749 474 791 553 710 421 470 688 347 
1995 1476 932 1019 1226 872 1074 521 758 904 547 
1996 1487 919 1036 1123 949 1018 673 214 920 524 
1997 1211 766 882 1016 911 1069 528 164 780 535 
1998 1463 1275 931 1116 936 1110 618 227 953 676 
1999 1389 1267 921 1021 876 942 624 231 915 597 
2000 1281 1230 799 1114 787 869 551 230 767 397 
2001 (pre) 957 932 551 871 600 665 397 436 565 278 
2001 (post) 6947 6804 3284 6031 4266 4632 2709 2401 4285 3841 
2002 7735 8716 2533 6798 5129 5763 3233 2239 4810 3631 
2003 5883 6433 1746 4793 3663 4447 2497 1373 3346 2669 
2004 5659 6163 1916 4576 3356 4236 2469 1328 3505 2583 
2005 4133 4726 1184 3226 2181 2928 1519 913 2790 1756 
2006 4052 4358 1030 3252 2198 2851 1182 1014 2632 1650 
2007 3189 3334 824 2577 1576 2265 502 683 2139 1085 
2008 2613 2764 489 1882 1300 1677 435 424 1559 933 
2009 2193 2177 412 1549 887 1143 383 327 1214 1350 
2010 2109 1998 811 1416 819 1048 373 191 1173 1114 
2011 1752 1624 303 1130 682 814 292 174 840 608 
 
                                                          
11
 NYT=New York Times, WP= Washington Post, DMN= Dallas Morning News, LAT= Los Angeles Times, HC= Huston Chronicle, CT=Chicago Tribune, PI= Philadelphia Inquirer, SFC= 
San Francisco Chronicle, NSL= Newark Star Ledger, BG= Boston Globe.  
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Figure 9-2: The number of terrorism related articles published each year by newspapers located in low risk cities12. 
Year 
Low Risk City Newspapers: Number of Terrorism Related Articles (1991-2011) 
*AR SAEN *SDUT *SJMN FTU *IS AAS *CD *CO *DFP 
1991 391 354 475 699 NF 25 483 115 565 NF 
1992 201 486 186 456 NF 37 371 55 435 NF 
1993 304 373 181 530 NF 59 534 72 651 NF 
1994 265 423 154 386 NF 33 382 80 905 NF 
1995 463 567 253 557 NF 62 396 147 327 NF 
1996 292 605 253 445 479 65 599 182 905 NF 
1997 NF 506 216 405 409 49 518 137 738 NF 
1998 NF 753 250 370 419 54 613 169 823 NF 
1999 90 607 257 470 301 6 505 109 812 233 
2000 64 622 223 407 356 113 232 77 767 184 
2001 (pre) 69 479 145 270 106 93 86 55 496 7 
2001 (post) 1462 3971 2187 2263 1210 1758 1050 1320 3804 428 
2002 1199 4498 1970 2259 993 1616 1052 995 4218 2219 
2003 1122 2898 1101 1402 580 832 824 710 2975 1472 
2004 1108 2745 1105 991 618 769 774 765 2925 151 
2005 794 667 860 900 288 420 559 425 2284 924 
2006 968 672 826 812 355 437 561 527 2379 635 
2007 638 471 463 581 209 299 358 384 1686 458 
2008 397 278 318 551 186 201 210 300 724 280 
2009 312 242 204 633 128 148 167 190 244 457 
2010 267 272 220 650 168 155 176 178 895 478 
2011 310 222 221 461 92 134 119 186 791 384 
Figure 10-1: The percentage of terrorism related articles published each year within each newspaper located in high risk cities. 
                                                          
12
 AR= Arizona Republic, SAEN= San Antonio Express News, SDUT= San Diego Union Tribune, SJMN= San Jose Mercury News, FTU= Florida Times-Union, IS= Indianapolis Star, 
AAS= Austin American Statesman, CD= Columbus Dispatch, CO= Charlotte Observer, DFP= Detroit Free Press 
For the Arizona Republic no data was found for 1997 and 1998, for Florida Times-Union no data was found for 1991 to 1995, and for the Detroit Free Press no data was found for 
1991 to 1998. 
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Year 
High Risk City Newspapers: Percentage of Terrorism Related Articles (1991-2011) 
NYT WP *DMN LAT HC CT PI SFC *NSL BG 
1991 1.97 1.53 2.41 3.08 2.50 2.00 2.88 5.06 0.88 1.90 
1992 1.45 1.05 2.04 1.81 1.68 1.57 2.01 3.27 0.80 1.28 
1993 2.16 1.36 2.63 2.15 2.36 2.17 2.30 3.94 2.24 1.70 
1994 1.51 1.24 2.03 1.57 1.55 1.67 1.91 2.84 1.89 1.29 
1995 2.43 1.55 4.37 2.44 2.44 2.53 2.36 4.59 2.48 2.04 
1996 2.45 1.52 4.45 2.23 2.66 2.40 3.05 1.29 2.52 1.95 
1997 1.99 1.27 3.79 2.02 2.55 2.52 2.39 0.99 2.14 1.99 
1998 2.41 2.11 4.00 2.22 2.62 2.61 2.80 1.37 2.61 2.51 
1999 2.28 2.10 3.95 2.03 2.46 2.22 2.83 1.40 2.51 2.22 
2000 2.11 2.04 3.43 2.21 2.21 2.05 2.50 1.39 2.10 1.48 
2001 (pre) 1.57 1.55 2.37 1.73 1.68 1.57 1.80 2.64 1.55 1.03 
2001 (post) 11.43 11.28 14.10 11.98 11.96 10.91 12.27 14.53 11.75 14.29 
2002 12.72 14.45 10.87 13.50 14.38 13.57 14.64 13.55 13.19 13.51 
2003 9.68 10.66 7.50 9.52 10.27 10.47 11.31 8.31 9.17 9.93 
2004 9.31 10.22 8.23 9.09 9.41 9.98 11.18 8.03 9.61 9.61 
2005 6.80 7.83 5.08 6.41 6.11 6.90 6.88 5.52 7.65 6.53 
2006 6.66 7.22 4.42 6.46 6.16 6.71 5.35 6.13 7.22 6.14 
2007 5.24 5.53 3.54 5.12 4.42 5.33 2.27 4.13 5.86 4.04 
2008 4.30 4.58 2.10 3.74 3.64 3.95 1.97 2.57 4.27 3.47 
2009 3.61 3.61 1.77 3.08 2.49 2.69 1.73 1.98 3.33 5.02 
2010 3.47 3.31 3.48 2.81 2.30 2.47 1.69 1.16 3.22 4.14 
2011 2.88 2.69 1.30 2.24 1.91 1.92 1.32 1.05 2.30 2.26 
 
Figure 10-2: The percentage of terrorism related articles published each year within each newspaper located in low risk cities. 
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Year 
Low Risk City Newspapers: Percentage of Terrorism Related Articles (1991-2011) 
*AR SAEN *SDUT *SJMN FTU *IS AAS *CD *CO *DFP 
1991 3.58 1.54 3.83 4.08 NF  0.34 4.36 1.59 1.86  NF 
1992 1.84 2.12 1.50 2.66  NF 0.50 3.35 0.76 1.43  NF 
1993 2.78 1.62 1.46 3.09  NF 0.80 4.82 0.99 2.15  NF 
1994 2.42 1.84 1.24 2.25  NF 0.45 3.45 1.10 2.98  NF 
1995 4.24 2.47 2.04 3.25  NF 0.84 3.57 2.03 1.08  NF 
1996 2.67 2.63 2.04 2.59 6.95 0.88 5.41 2.51 2.98  NF 
1997  NF 2.20 1.74 2.36 5.93 0.67 4.68 1.89 2.43  NF 
1998  NF 3.28 2.02 2.16 6.08 0.73 5.53 2.33 2.71  NF 
1999 0.82 2.64 2.07 2.74 4.36 0.08 4.56 1.50 2.68 2.80 
2000 0.59 2.71 1.80 2.37 5.16 1.53 2.09 1.06 2.53 2.21 
2001 (pre) 0.63 2.09 1.17 1.57 1.54 1.26 0.78 0.76 1.63 0.08 
2001 (post) 13.38 17.29 17.65 13.19 17.54 23.94 9.48 18.19 12.53 5.15 
2002 10.97 19.59 15.90 13.17 14.40 21.94 9.49 13.71 13.90 26.70 
2003 10.27 12.62 8.89 8.17 8.41 11.30 7.44 9.79 9.80 17.71 
2004 10.14 11.95 8.92 5.78 8.96 10.44 6.99 10.54 9.64 1.82 
2005 7.26 2.90 6.94 5.25 4.18 5.70 5.05 5.86 7.53 11.12 
2006 8.86 2.93 6.67 4.73 5.15 5.93 5.06 7.26 7.84 7.64 
2007 5.84 2.05 3.74 3.39 3.03 4.06 3.23 5.29 5.56 5.51 
2008 3.63 1.21 2.57 3.21 2.70 2.73 1.90 4.14 2.39 3.37 
2009 2.85 1.05 1.65 3.69 1.86 2.01 1.51 2.62 0.80 5.50 
2010 2.44 1.18 1.78 3.79 2.44 2.10 1.59 2.45 2.95 5.75 
2011 2.84 0.97 1.78 2.69 1.33 1.82 1.07 2.56 2.61 4.62 
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Houston Chronicle, Chicago Tribune, Philadelphia Inquirer, San Antonio Express News, and 
Detroit Free Press
13
. These newspapers maintained the most publications in 2002, however, only 
by a small margin.  For all other newspapers, 2002 was closely behind 2001 (post 9/11) with the 
second most publications.  Furthermore, in 2001 the four months following the attacks sustained 
a far greater level of publication then the eight months prior.  For high risk cities, the average 
percent of terrorism related articles published in the four months following 9/11 was 12.45%, 
while the average for the eight months prior was only 1.75%.  The difference was even more 
significant for low risk cities which had a 14.83% average for the four months after 9/11 and 
1.25% for the eight months prior. Despite the fact the low risk cities had a greater initial increase 
than the high risk cities; the data analysis reveals the difference was insignificant.  In fact, only 
nineteen of the fifty-eight analyses yielded significant variations.  Table 1 shows the results for 
all the analyses conducted, which are discussed throughout the rest of this chapter. 
Table 1.  Media Response to September 11 Terrorist Attacks
14
  
City Risk Level: High Risk Low Risk  
 M SD M   SD Sig. (2-tailed) 
1991 – 2011 % Means 4.45 3.60 4.64 4.17 p< .305 
Post 9/11 % Means 6.68 4.02 6.94 4.96 p< .500 
2001.5 – 2004 % Means 11.25 1.98 12.44 3.54 p< .243 
2001.5 – 2006 % Means 9.64 2.94 10.35 4.23 p< .283 
2007 – 2011 % Means 3.14 0.94 2.83 0.77 p< .132 
2009 – 2011 % Means 2.57 0.51 2.41 0.21 p< .559 
    
Time Period: Pre 9/11 Post 9/11  
 M SD M SD Sig. (2-tailed 
High Risk % Means 2.21 0.34 6.68 4.02 p> .004* 
Low Risk % Means 2.34 0.58 6.94 4.96 p< .012* 
      
                                                          
13
 No data was found for the Detroit Free Press for the years 1991 to 1998 which may have skewed the data to 
some extent.  This may explains the alarmingly high finding for 2002. 
14
 A confidence interval of 95% was used in each t-test.  The asterisks (*) indicate the analyses with statistically 
significant findings.  
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Pervious Five Years 
(1996-2000) 
First Five Years 
(2002-2006) 
 
 M SD M SD Sig. (2-tailed 
High Risk % Means 2.33 0.17 9.08 2.90 p> .007* 
Low Risk % Means 2.73 0.42 9.46 4.05 p> .020* 
      
 
 
First Five Years 
(2002- 2006) 
Last Five Years 
(2007-2011) 
 
 M SD M SD Sig. (2-tailed) 
High Risk % Means 9.08 2.90 3.14 .944 p> .008* 
Low Risk % Means 9.46 4.05 2.83 0.77 p > .020* 
    
 
First Three Years 
(2002- 2004) 
Next Three Years 
(2005-2007) 
 
 M SD M SD Sig. (2-tailed) 
High Risk % Means 10.86 2.23 5.78 1.08 p> .041* 
Low Risk % Means 11.64 3.87 5.51 1.16 p< .101 
      
 
Previous Five Years 
(1996-2000) 
Last Five Years 
(2007-2011) 
 
2007-2011 
 
 
 M SD M SD Sig. (2-tailed) 
High Risk % Means 2.33 0.17 3.14 0.94 p< .129 
Low Risk % Means 2.73 0.42 2.83 0.77 p< .798 
      
 
 
 
Physical Impacts / No Physical 
Impacts: 
NYT and WP 
All Other 
Newspapers 
 
 
 M SD M SD Sig. (2-tailed) 
1991 – 2011 % Means 4.48 3.71 4.56 3.95 p< .695 
Post 9/11 % Means 7.15 3.62 6.81 4.63 p< .378 
2001.5 – 2004 % Means 11.21 1.71 12.02 2.83 p< .345 
2001.5 – 2006 % Means 9.55 2.49 10.11 3.69 p< .673 
2007 – 2011 % Means 3.92 1.01 2.86 0.87 p>.008* 
2009 – 2011 % Means 3.26 0.427 2.34 0.31 p> .016* 
    
Political Orientation: Conservative Liberal  
 M SD M SD Sig. (2-tailed) 
1991 – 2011 % Means 4.54 4.07 4.55 3.77 p< .963 
Post 9/11 % Means 6.69 4.93 6.96 4.12 p< .560 
2001.5 – 2004 % Means 12.29 3.10 11.44 2.81 p< .473 
2001.5 – 2006 % Means 10.11 4.14 9.93 3.21 p< .823 
2007 – 2011 % Means 2.58 0.91 3.39 0.76 p> .004* 
2009 – 2011 % Means 2.00 0.23 3.00 0.44 p< .078 
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Proximity: Northeast West  
 M SD M SD Sig. (2-tailed) 
1991 – 2011 % Means 4.47 3.72 4.44 3.71 p= .870 
Post 9/11 % Means 6.89 4.00 6.59 4.27 p= .278 
2001.5 – 2004 % Means 11.47 1.78 11.24 2.95 p= .770 
2001.5 – 2006 % Means 9.86 2.85 9.63 3.38 p= .643 
2007 – 2011 % Means 3.31 0.77 2.95 0.91 p= .100 
2009 – 2011 % Means 2.91 0.64 2.38 0.26 p= .148 
      
 Northeast Mid-West  
 M SD M SD Sig. (2-tailed) 
1991 – 2011 % Means 4.47 3.72 4.64 4.92 p= .584 
Post 9/11 % Means 6.89 4.00 7.82 5.34 p= .127 
2001.5 – 2004 % Means 11.47 1.78 13.5 4.49 p= .261 
2001.5 – 2006 % Means 9.86 2.85 11.38 4.79 p= .185 
2007 – 2011 % Means 3.31 0.77 3.54 0.88 p= .255 
2009 – 2011 % Means 2.91 0.64 3.04 0.27 p= .620 
      
 Northeast  South  
 M SD M SD Sig. (2-tailed) 
1991 – 2011 % Means 4.47 3.72 4.54 3.65 p= .682 
Post 9/11 % Means 6.89 4.00 6.34 4.51 p= .033* 
2001.5 – 2004 % Means 11.47 1.78 11.54 2.44 p= .859 
2001.5 – 2006 % Means 9.86 2.85 9.54 3.63 p= .405 
2007 – 2011 % Means 3.31 0.77 2.51 0.87 p= .016* 
2009 – 2011 % Means 2.91 0.64 2.01 0.40 p= .110 
      
 West South  
 M SD M SD Sig. (2-tailed) 
1991 – 2011 % Means 4.44 3.71 4.54 3.65 p= .611 
Post 9/11 % Means 6.59 4.27 6.34 4.51 p= .226 
2001.5 – 2004 % Means 11.24 2.95 11.54 2.44 p= .452 
2001.5 – 2006 % Means 9.63 3.38 9.54 3.63 p= .788 
2007 – 2011 % Means 2.95 0.91 2.51 0.87 p= .036* 
2009 – 2011 % Means 2.38 0.26 2.01 0.40 p= .264 
      
 West Mid-west  
 M SD M SD Sig. (2-tailed) 
1991 – 2011 % Means 4.44 3.71 4.64 4.92 p= .564  
Post 9/11 % Means 6.59 4.27 7.82 5.34 p= .038* 
2001.5 – 2004 % Means 11.24 2.95 13.5 4.49 p= .189 
2001.5 – 2006 % Means 9.63 3.38 11.38 4.79 p= .113 
2007 – 2011 % Means 2.95 0.91 3.54 0.88 p= .001* 
2009 – 2011 % Means 2.38 0.26 3.04 0.27 p= .012* 
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 South Mid-west  
 M SD M SD Sig. (2-tailed) 
1991 – 2011 % Means 4.54 3.65 4.64 4.92 p=  .789  
Post 9/11 % Means 6.34 4.51 7.82 5.34 p= .010* 
2001.5 – 2004 % Means 11.54 2.44 13.5 4.49 p= .235 
2001.5 – 2006 % Means 9.54 3.63 11.38 4.79 p= .081 
2007 – 2011 % Means 2.51 0.87 3.54 0.88 p= .001* 
2009 – 2011 % Means 2.01 0.40 3.04 0.27 p= .028* 
      
 
 Examining the information flow within each risk category helped to better under stand 
the media response to 9/11.  As expected, for HRC the pre 9/11 percent means (M=2.21) was 
significantly lower than the post 9/11 percent means (M=6.68), which yielded a significance 
value of p > .004.  Likewise, the LRC pre 9/11 percent means (M=2.34) were significantly lower 
(p> .012) than that of the post 9/11 (M=6.94).  These findings clearly indicate that information 
flow increased significantly after 9/11 in both high and low risk cities.  The twenty newspapers 
used in this study published many more terrorism related articles after the terrorist attacks.   
 As is seen in Figure 12-1 and 12-2, there was a steady decline in information flow after 
the initial increase.  This decline was examined more closely, and the data analyses reveal for 
HRC the first five years (2002 -2006) percent means (M=9.08) were statistically greater (p> 
.008) than the last five years (2007-2011) (M=3.14).  The same analyses for LRC also reveal a 
significant difference (p> .020) between the two time periods. These findings indicate for both 
HRC and LRC the increased information flow after 9/11 was only sustained for five years at the 
most.  By 2007, the media response had decreased significantly.  Furthermore, a three year 
analyses was conducted on this same data set to better determine how long the media response 
actually was sustained for.  The findings revealed for HRC the percent means for the first three 
years (2002-2004) was significantly different (p>.041) than percent means for the next three 
years (2005-2007); however, for LRC there was no statistical difference (p< .101).  This 
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indicates after three year the information flow declined significantly in HRC, but the LRC 
information flow did not do so until at least five years after the attacks.  It was expected the HRC 
would have experienced a greater increase in information flow after 9/11 than the LRC, however, 
the data analyses reveals this to be incorrect.  The HRC and LRC experience similar media 
responses after 9/11, the only variation occurring in the fact the LRC sustained a greater level of 
information flow for slightly longer than the HRC.  These findings make it evident the city risk 
level had no effect on the media response to 9/11 other than the how long the response was 
sustained. 
 Furthermore, to determine whether information flow ever return to pre 9/11 levels the 
previous five years (1996-2000) was compared to the last five years (2007-2011).  For HRC the 
percent means for the previous five years (M=2.33) was not significantly different (p< .129) 
from the last percent means for the last five years (M=3.14).  Likewise, there was no statistically 
difference (p< .798) between the same time periods in LRC.  These finding revealed that by 2007 
the information flow had returned to pre 9/11 levels in both HRC and LRC.  This drastic 
information increase and the steady decline are illustrated in Figure 12-1 and 12-2. 
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Figure 12-1: 
   
Figure 12-2
15
: 
 
                                                          
15
 A large spike in the percentage of terrorism related articles published by the Detroit Free Press is seen in 2002.  
This is due to the fact there were no findings for the Detroit Free Press from 1991 to 1998.  As a result of the seven 
missing values, the percentage of terrorism related articles for the remaining years were increased slightly. 
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 For the city risk variable and each time period manipulation, no statistical difference was 
found between high risk and low risk cities.  These findings indicate the media response in high 
risk cities and low risk cities was similar and the difference in terrorism risk did not affect the 
media response.  Figure 11 illustrates the high and low risk information flow form 1991 to 2011, 
and in fact, the low risk cities had a slightly higher initial response. 
Figure 11: 
 
Table 1 also shows the data analyses finding for the impact variable. The newspapers 
which are located in the cities that experienced the immediate physical impacts, New York 
Times and Washington Post, were compared to the newspapers located in cities that did not 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
In addition, the Detroit Free Press, Florida Times-Union, and Arizona Republic were missing data, which explains 
why the line graph for these newspapers has either a break where no data was plotted or why the line graph does 
not begin at 1991.  
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suffer any physical impacts, all other newspapers.  The findings reveal the only significant 
difference in media response between the two groups occurred in how long the increased 
information flow was sustained.  For the impacted group, the percent means for the last five 
years (2007-2011) (M=3.92), were significantly greater (p< .008) than non-impacted group 
percent means (M=2.86).  Likewise, the impacted group information flow was significantly 
greater (p< .016) than that of the non-impacted in the last three years (2009-2011) as well.  These 
findings indicate the initial media response to 9/11 was not significantly different, and whether 
the newspaper resided in an impacted city or not made no difference.  However, it did make a 
difference in regards to how long the increased information flow was sustained.   Figure 13 more 
clearly illustrates these findings.  As the graph shows, starting in 2002 the New York Times and 
Washington Post maintained greater information flow and by 2007 the difference was 
statistically significant.  The newspapers in the impacted cities maintained a significantly greater 
information flow in the latter half of the decade following 9/11.   
Figure 13: 
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Furthermore, similar findings were also found in regards to the political orientation 
variable.  The media response was almost identical for liberal and conservative newspapers.  The 
initial response yielded no differences, however, it is evident the liberal newspapers sustained a 
significantly higher information flow level starting in 2007.  The percent means for the last five 
years (2007-2011) were significantly greater (p> .010) in liberal newspapers (M=3.33) than it 
was in conservative cities (M=2.57).  Figure 14 more clearly illustrates this difference.  The 
graph clearly shows starting to 2007 conservative newspapers experienced a drastic decline, 
while liberal newspapers only steadily declined.  With that, starting in 2007 conservative 
newspapers maintained a significantly lower information flow level than liberal newspapers; 
however, by 2009 there was no significant difference.  These findings indicate political 
orientation had no affect on the initial response. 
Figure 14: 
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Lastly, data analyses were conducted to determine if proximity to the attacks made any 
difference.  The findings revealed the media response for newspapers located in the Northeast 
was no different than that of the West and Midwest
16
.  However, the percent means for the 
overall post 9/11 period (2001-2011) were significantly greater (p> .033) for the Northeast 
(M=6.89) than for the South (M= 6.34).  This difference was mainly due to the fact Northeast 
newspapers sustained a greater media response than the South newspapers during the later part of 
the decade following 9/11.  In fact, there was no difference between the initial increases in 
information flow, but the last five years (2007-2011) were significantly different (p > .016).  
Figure 7 better illustrates this difference.  As the graph reveals, starting in 2007 the South had a 
significantly lower information flow level then the Northeast; however, by 2009 there was not 
statistical difference.   
Similar results were found between newspapers located in the South and newspapers in 
the West.  The data analyses reveals the West and the South did not have any statistical 
difference in the initial media response; however, the percent means for the last five years (2007-
2011) were significantly greater (p > .036) in the West (M=2.95) than they were in the South 
(2.51).  However, the information flow in the last three years revealed no difference.  The 
findings reveal the West newspapers sustained a significantly higher information flow level than 
did the South newspapers starting in 2007 however, by 2009 there again was no statistical 
difference slightly.  The information flow in the South newspapers declined more steadily than 
did the Midwest newspapers.  The percent means for the Mid-west newspapers were 
                                                          
16
 The data for the Midwest may have been slightly skewed due to the fact there were no findings for the Detroit 
Free Press from 1991 to 1997.  As a result of the seven missing values, the percentage for the remaining years 
were increased slightly. 
55 
 
significantly greater than the South, not only in the last five years (2007-2011) (p > .001), but 
also in the last three years (2009-2010) (p > .028).  Likewise, the percent means for the Midwest 
newspapers are also significantly greater than those of the West in the last five years and last 
three years.   
These findings indicate that proximity had no impact on the initial increase in 
information flow but it did in regards to how rapidly the information flow level decreased.  
Overall, the information flow for the South declined more rapidly than every other region 
Midwest, West, and Northeast.  In addition, the Midwest information flow also declined more 
slowly than the West, but not the Northeast.  The media response for each region is illustrated in 
Figure 15.   
Figure 15: 
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
Normative Tragedy Actuated Response Theory vs Moral Panic Theory 
This section establishes a sociological perspective on the societal response following 
9/11.  As was illustrated in the data presented previously, after the terrorist attacks on September 
11, 2001 a period of substantial change occurred, the FBI organizational development and the 
increased information flow are two examples of it.  The drastic increase in information flow in 
the first couple years after 9/11, and the steady decline in the remaining part of the decade 
effectively portray the media’s response to 9/11. Likewise, the FBI organizational development, 
through 2009, is representative of the response maintained by social control agents.  Recently 
scholars have begun to explain these responses to 9/11 as a moral panic.  The moral panic theory 
established by Stanley Cohen in 1972 and later applied to the 9/11 societal response,  is 
explained in greater detail later in this chapter; however, I establish my own theory, the 
normative tragedy actuated response,  which fundamentally opposes the concepts established in 
the moral panic theory.   The normative tragedy actuated response theory argues that, following 
9/11 public fear developed into an insurmountable force influencing and controlling several 
aspects of society including the media and agents of social control.   
Fundamental Concept of the Moral Panic Theory 
The moral panic theory, established originally by British sociologist Stanley Cohen in 
Folk Devils and Moral panics 1972, is traditionally applied to topics such as sex, drugs, and 
various deviant sub-cultures. The moral panic theory was originally used to ―depict the reactions 
of the media, the public, and the agents of social control to relatively minor disturbances between 
the Mod and Rocker youth cultures in England‖ (Rothe & Muzzatti 2004: 329).  Essentially, a 
moral panic is a fundamentally inappropriate societal reaction to a perceived deviant event or 
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behavior.  The moral panic theory states that the media, the public, and the formal agents of 
social control (more specifically law enforcement and politicians) response to a perceived moral 
threat is inherently disproportionate to the actual threat posed on society.  ―Moral panic is the 
perception of threat and not its actual existence that is important‖(Garland 2008:11). Although a 
certain deviant group or deviant behavior is present, there is an absence of a legitimate imminent 
threat.  According to moral panic theorists, the media, the strongest force in this phenomenon, 
creates a sense of insecurity within the citizens and make it appear as if the ―threat‖ is more 
prevalent then it actually is (Garland 2008:11).  The citizens are exposed to the media’s over-
dramatization and distortion, and with that, fear is instilled in the public’s mind, fear mongering.  
As the media strengthens public fear, politicians then exploit this fear to achieve personal 
agendas and employ public policy that is often intrusive and unconstitutional.   Additionally, 
major law enforcement operations are launched, which establish a false sense of security and are 
borderline illegal, often imposing on the citizen’s basic civil liberties.  According to Cohen, 
―Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten except in folklore and collective memory.  At 
other times it has more serious and long lasting repercussions and might produce such changes as 
those legal and social policy or even in the way society conceives itself‖ (Cohen 2002: 9).  
Public policy initiated during a moral panic often is maintained even after the panic has passed, 
often times creating injustices for many years (Garland 2008 13).  Cohen’s theory is applied in 
many different scenarios and each application is different from the next, but the fundamental 
concepts remain the same.   In regards to criminology, Cohen’s theory is undoubtedly highly 
applicable when characterizing certain reactions to ordinary crime such as drug use.  However, 
my study argues the moral panic theory is not sufficient in characterizing the societal response to 
9/11, and establishes a more comprehensive perspective.   
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After the 9/11 attacks several moral panic sociologists, (Joel Best, Philip Jenkins, Eric 
Gooode), were interviewed ―all of whom took great care to refuse the attribution of this term to 
the reaction, even though as they noted, it appeared to fit the model in most respects‖ (Garland 
2008:24). Assumingly, these theorist refuted the 9/11 response as a moral panic due to their 
uncertainty regarding the nature of the threat.  However, over ten years after the attacks, the 
nature of the threat is apparent, and the statements expressed by these theorists remain valid.  
Although the 9/11 response may fit the moral panic criteria in most aspects, there are 
fundamental differences between this instance and the theory’s various other applications.  There 
are two inherent differences between a true moral panic and the 9/11 response.  First, a moral 
panic generally exists surrounding ―threats,‖ which may be deviant in their own right, but do not 
pose a legitimate imminent threat to the fabric of society. For example, Cohen (2002) presented 
the minor conflicts between Mod and Rocker youth subcultures.  The conflicts between these 
two groups did indeed cause disturbances within the community; however, it did not present a 
threat that had the capability to disrupt the successful functioning of society, as terrorism does. 
Thus, Cohen classified the reaction to this perceived threat as a moral panic.  However, 9/11 took 
the lives of almost 3,000 people and threatened the lives of an entire nation.  The successful and 
unexpected attack presented a genuine imminent threat.  A future attack on the United States was 
a completely viable possibility.  Throughout the decade following 9/11, there were countless 
number of attempted terrorist attacks and plots.  For example a few attempted attacks included 
Richard Reid’s (aka ―The Shoe Bomber‖) attempt to bomb American Airlines flight, Najibullah 
Zazi’s plot to bomb the New York City subway station, David Headley’s plot to bomb a Danish 
newspaper’s office, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines 
flight 253, Faisal Shahzad’s attempted times square bombing, Sami Osmakac’s plot to bomb 
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nightclubs and bridges around New Jersey, and the 2006 plot to bomb several flights from Great 
Britain to the United States (fbi.gov).  Figure 16 reveals how great the threat truly was despite 
Rothe and Muzzatti perspective.     
Figure 16: 
 
(fbi.gov) 
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 Attempts to comprise United States national security were continuously presented even 
after 9/11, which established an existential threat to society.  The nine years after 9/11 maintain 
over double the number terrorist attacks and plots in the eleven years prior (fbi.gov).  
Additionally, the anthrax scare in 2002 further exemplified the fact that terrorism was an 
existential threat in the United States.  The anthrax attack predominated as the worst biological 
attack in United States history, in which letters were laced with anthrax and put in the mail.  This 
attack killed five people and severely sickened seventeen others, and effectively served as the 
second successful large scale terrorist attack on the United States in less than two years.  As if 
the terrorism threat in the United States was not evident enough, countries around the world also 
became subject to tragedies similar to 9/11. In 2005, the United Kingdom experienced a series of 
bombings in London subway trains and stations, as well as city busses. Likewise, in 2006 Spain 
fell subject to countless bombings that targeted various offices and airports. More countries 
around the world were faced with the same looming threat as the United States was.  It became 
clear similar attacks on the United States could occur anywhere at anytime, as was consistently 
seen around the world.  Contrary to Rothe and Muzzatti’s claims, the threat posed by the 9/11 
attacks were by no means a perceived threat. The 9/11 attacks compromised the nation’s 
security, and even more so, challenged that of comparable countries around the world.  This was 
not just an instance of a deviant subculture disrupting the local community; it was a mass murder 
that instantly impacted an entire nation.  The 9/11 attack was the first terrorist threat of such 
magnitude in the history of the United States.   
Secondly, according to Cohen’s theory, a moral panic occurs when the societal response 
is significantly disproportionate to the actual threat.  One of Cohen’s shortcomings is his failure 
to define proportionality, in turn, this makes it difficult to determine whether a response is 
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inappropriate or not. Regardless, with an event like 9/11 it becomes hard to classify the ensuing 
reaction as disproportionate.  Reason tells us a threat of great magnitude justifies a response in 
great magnitude.  With that said, it is not unreasonable to state proportionality is determined by 
the relationship between the threat and the reaction.  Moral panic theorists who applied Cohen’s 
theory to the 9/11 response, such as Jeffery Victor in his article ―Why the Terrorism Scare is a 
Moral Panic‖ (2006) and Rothe and Muzzatti in their article ―Enemies Everywhere: Terrorism, 
Moral panic, and U.S. Civil Society‖ (2004) ignore the threat’s severity.  Both Victor and Rothe 
and Muzzatti over analyze the reaction to 9/11, but fail to take into consideration the actual 
threat.  As Garland states, 
―Moral panic analysis tends to lose sight of this relation, making the underlying problem disappear and 
disregarding the concerns of those adversely affected by it.  The trick is to think not in terms of an absolute 
distinction (study reaction but not deviance, punishment but not crime) but in terms of relative autonomy- 
studying the multiple dynamics of reaction, only some of which relate to the deviance being addressed‖ 
(Garland 2008: 23). 
Not once in Victor or Rothe and Muzzatti’s article do they discuss the terrorist attack itself and 
the threat it imposed.  Victor argues the threat imposed on the United States was ―hyped beyond 
reason‖ (2006: 1) and Rothe and Muzzatti support this sentiment personifying the societal 
response as a ―misguided public consciousness‖ (2004: 327).  The societal response to 9/11 may 
have been significantly greater than for other threats; however, it was proportionate to the threat 
terrorism presented.  The societal response was by no means ―over hyped‖ or ―disproportionate,‖ 
which is supported later in this chapter.  It is essential to understand a great threat warrants a 
great response.  Each threat presents a different response and needs to be analyzed with a 
separate frame work, which the previous scholars fail to do.  As was mentioned previously, 
terrorism is much different compared to ordinary crime (moral panic theory’s more common 
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application), thus, theory regarding the 9/11 response should maintain inherently different 
concepts.  The remainder of this chapter elaborates these two fundamental differences while 
establishing a more comprehensive theory. The normative tragedy actuated response reframes 
the 9/11 response and better theorizes the forces behind the societal adaptations.   
Normative Tragedy Actuated Response 
The normative tragedy actuated response claims that following a tragic event, like 9/11, a 
normal and appropriate response is initiated.  Relatively speaking, this response is on a much 
larger scale than an ordinary threat would elicit. Nonetheless, the response is in proportion to the 
tragic event.  There are four characteristics of a normative tragedy actuated response which 
include: 1) presence of a tragic event, 2) public fear, 3) national response and reformation, and 4) 
adverse consequences.   The 9/11 attack fits all four characteristics and are outlined in greater 
detail throughout the rest of this chapter. 
1. Presence of a Tragic Event 
By definition a tragedy, simply put, is ―an event of great sadness or suffering‖ (Oxford 
Dictionary 972).  Although a tragedy indeed is emotionally provoking and causes great suffering, 
the normative tragedy actuated response theory further characterizes a tragedy in three aspects.  
First, the tragedy is classified as an event that directly causes a mass loss of life and injury or 
causes a significant negative impact on normal life functioning in an entire population.  In the 
case of 9/11, almost 3,000 people were killed and many more were injured effectively qualifying 
as a tragedy in this regard.  Generally speaking terrorist attacks meet the first criteria, because 
terrorist organizations often target large populations within the public sector and aim their efforts 
at causing harm to the largest number of individuals as possible. Other types of tragedy may 
include a natural disaster such as the 2011 Japan earthquake which killed over 11,000 people and 
63 
 
changed the lives of many more.  However, solely, the mass loss of life is insufficient to 
classifying an event as a tragedy 
The second characteristic of a tragedy is the presence of civilian and noncombatant 
victims.  The 9/11 attacks targeted the United States citizens, presumably, all of whom did 
nothing to warrant the victimization they experienced.  For the victims of 9/11 it was just a 
normal Tuesday morning, most going about a normal work day, when they unjustly fell victim to 
the terrorist attack.  A war certainly is characterized by the mass loss of life and is a 
tremendously saddening phenomenon, thus, it meets the first criteria.  However, contrary to the 
9/11 victims, for the most part war victims knowingly serve to provide the nation’s defense 
against similar attacks and are expected to participate in violent offensive actions.  Death during 
the course of military advancements is an act of war not a tragedy. A fine line distinguishes the 
two apart.  A good example that portrays the small difference is the Pearl Harbor attack.  Pearl 
Harbor was undoubtedly a sad event in United States history and was very similar to the 9/11 
attacks; however, the normative tragedy actuated response does not classify it as a tragedy.  
Although the United States was not officially in war with Japan, it was a time of turmoil and 
international conflict and military action was not unjustifiable.  The victims of Pearl Harbor were 
predominately military personnel whom were well aware of the possibility of such attacks, in 
turn making the attack an act of war on the United States not a tragedy.   The presence of civilian 
and noncombatant victims is essential to a tragedy’s characterization because it indicates the 
target population was vulnerable, defenseless, and unjustly victimized   
Lastly, the third characteristic of a tragedy is the large scale social change following the 
incident. The normative tragedy actuated response defines a large scale social change as any 
altercation in the standard of living or populace management across a large region, such as on a 
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state or national level.  For example when a community falls subject to a high number of 
homicides at the hand of a serial killer, that community may employ social change to counteract 
the offender. Certain law enforcement operations are launched and, at the behest of the 
community, lawmakers may even enact new public policy.  However, the social change is 
generally restricted to that specific community and other populations unaffected by the serial 
killings, generally, do not experience any social change. On the contrary, when a tragedy occurs 
a populace directly unaffected by the event still maintain similar, if not identical, social 
adaptations as the directly impacted community.  After 9/11 the entire nation experienced some 
sort of social change, regardless of whether the community was directly impacted by the attacks 
or not.  The nation became concerned with terrorism, thus, enacted national plans to prevent any 
future attacks.  The 9/11 attacks may have only directly impacted New York City, Washington 
D.C., and Shanksville, Pennsylvania, but every city and town across the United States 
experienced the impact.   The social change employed after 9/11 is discussed in greater detail 
later in this chapter.  From the normative tragedy actuated response perspective, if the event did 
not produce social change on a large scale it was not a large scale problem and is not 
characterized as a tragedy.    
A particular event must meet these three characteristics in order to classify as a tragedy.  
Furthermore, the normative tragedy Actuate Response states, after an event characterized by the 
pervious three features occur, a significant level of fear is established across the public sector.   
2. Mass Public Fear of the Tragedy 
In the course of a normative tragedy actuated response the tragedy itself has the ability to 
establish substantial public fear, as is seen in the case of 9/11.  Moral panic theorist, like Rothe 
and Muzzatti (2004), argue the public fear following 9/11 was the result of the media influence, 
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which is discussed later in greater detail.  However, the normative tragedy actuated response 
contends the attacks and the atrocities surrounding the attacks were responsible for establishing 
public fear across the nation.    
Immediately after 9/11 fear plagued the nation and safety was called into question.  The 
9/11 victims were attacked while going about their work day at the office, the last place anyone 
would imagine they could possibly be attacked.  The attacks came abruptly and unexpectedly 
leading the public to believe a similar attack could happen at anytime and anywhere.  Masters 
argues, as the public faced many ―unknowns‖ they no longer felt safe.   Studies conducted after 
9/11 revealed ―a heightened sense of stress and anxiety‖ (Masters 2006: 370) within the public, 
which was ―not limited to persons living in the immediate areas of the attacks…people in other 
parts of the country were also affected in various ways resulting in symptoms of stress‖ (2006: 
370).  This is supported in Updegraff’s 2008 longitudinal study as he explains, although most 
individuals were not directly exposed to the events, many reported strongly identifying with the 
victims, which seemed to be sufficient in creating personal fear and anxiety (2008: 711). The 
normative tragedy actuated response theory refers to this ensuing fear as tragedy fixated 
apprehension.  The development of tragedy fixated apprehension is effectively described by the 
fundamental concepts of the Terror Management Theory (TMT), which is a psychological 
paradigm that contends fear and anxiety (tragedy fixated apprehension) originate from the 
realization of vulnerability and mortality (Solomon, Greenberg, and Pyszcynki 2003).  
According to the TMT, the atrocities of a traumatic event completely challenged the public’s 
beliefs that the world is benevolent, predictable, and meaningful (Janoff-Bulman 1992; Taylor 
1993).  According to several Tragedy Management theorist, individuals internalize these belief 
and acquire a sense of security from them, therefore, when these assumptions are violated, as 
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they were with the 9/11 attacks, many experience extreme distress (tragedy fixated 
apprehension) (Janoff-Bulman 1992).  As the 9/11 attacks challenged the fundamental beliefs 
that the world we live in is benevolent and predictable, feelings of vulnerability and mortality 
were significantly intensified (Janoff-Bulman 1995, Norris and Kaniasty 1991).  The trauma 
witnessed and experienced on September 11, 2001 increased ―morality salience (the degree to 
which an individual is aware of his morality)‖ (McBride 2011: 562).  According to the Tragedy 
Management Theory: 
―Potentially paralyzing dread of death is thus the inevitable result of self-conscious organism.  The 
horror is compounded by the realization of one’s profound vulnerability.  Death can occur at any 
time for reasons that often cannot be anticipated or controlled…Furthermore, this horror and dread 
of death becomes amalgamated into unmitigated terror when combined with the recognition that 
humans are…no more fundamentally significant or enduring than a fly‖ 
This realization of vulnerability, insecurity, lack of control, and morality created intense tragedy 
fixated apprehension.  After the attacks, the public sector recognized another attack could happen 
at any time.  As Bonnie 2004 states, ―Perhaps the most prominent fear, on the topic at hand, is 
fear of an unknown and unpredictable terrorist attack‖ (Bonnie 2004: 161).  Many individuals 
suffered from tragedy fixated apprehension so severely they experienced significant life changes.  
According to Torabi and Seo, many people avoided public transportation or areas where large 
crowds gathered such as stadiums, airports, and train stations.  Torabi and Seo’s study regarding 
life changes since 9/11 reports:  
 ―The most prominent life change was that people had become more anxious and emotional…This 
included increased caution of surroundings and people; avoiding crowded areas; feeling worried, 
scared, or depressed; apprehension about deployment of loved ones, and antagonism against Arabs 
or Islamic cultures.  The next general changes were reluctance or avoidance of flying, increased 
concern about politics and world events.‖  (Torabi & Seo 2004: 187).     
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The public became fixated with thoughts concerning another terrorist strike and internalized the 
belief that they could fall victim next.  The individuals whom experienced tragedy fixated 
apprehension felt anxious and constantly worried about future terrorist attacks.  Master (2006), 
Schuster (2001), Lindsey et. al (2007) and Torabi and Seo (2004) all agree the ensuing public 
fear was characteristic of apprehension and discomfort.  Interviews conducted after 9/11 on 
individuals around the country revealed an unusually high stress level within the public.  As one 
individual stated, ―I was bothered by things that usually don’t bother me; I did not feel like 
eating; I had trouble keeping my mind on what I was doing; I felt that everything I did was an 
effort; My sleep was restless; I talked less than usual; I could not get going‖ (Lindsey et. al 
2007:7).  Almost half of adults polled reported substantial stress symptoms and 90% reported at 
least low level stress symptoms after 9/11 (Schuster et. al. 2001: 1510). According to Schuster et. 
al. 2007, ―the effect [9/11 attack] may be greatest when a loved one or acquaintance is harmed, 
but others who may personalize the event and think of themselves as potential victims can also 
have stress‖ (1511).  Individuals who genuinely believed they could fall victim to a future attack 
experienced tragedy fixated apprehension including individuals in areas that lacked proximity to 
the attack.  Schuster’s findings indicate, practically the entire public sector experienced some 
form of public fear, which the normative tragedy actuated response argues was the direct result 
of the attacks themselves.  The mass murder and devastation created intense public fear which 
became a principle force in the post 9/11 societal response.     
Rothe and Muzzatti (2004) apply Cohen’s moral panic theory to describe the societal 
9/11 response which ironically does not even describe the ―panic‖ that occurred.  Rothe and 
Muzzatti focused solely on what caused this public panic response, the media’s over 
dramatization and social control agent’s illegal operations, but they do not explain the nature of 
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the alleged panic.  In order to understand how public ―panic‖ (fear) was established one needs to 
completely understand the nature of the fear, as was described in the previous paragraph.  
Without doing so first, it is impossible to accurately identify its cause. With that, it becomes hard 
to understand how the media and agents of social control created this panic considering a panic 
response was never even established in their argument.  After taking a closer look at the 
intricacies within the ensuing tragedy fixated apprehension it is evident this fear greatly 
influenced the societal response to 9/11 regarding the media and agents of social control.  
3. National Response and Reformation 
Contrary to moral panic theorist like Jeffery Victor and Rothe and Muzzatti, the public 
fear ensuing 9/11 was not due to the media influence, but rather the atrocities of the terrorist act 
itself.  The normative tragedy actuated response describes tragedy fixated apprehension as an 
insurmountable force influencing several aspects of society including media and agents of social 
control.  Using the data presented in chapter two and three, this section examines how tragedy 
fixated apprehension influenced the media and FBI response to the attacks.  
The Media 
The normative tragedy actuate response opposes the moral panic theory and claims public 
fear, tragedy fixated apprehension, created by the horrible attacks, influenced the 9/11 societal 
response.  Tragedy fixated apprehension became an insurmountable force which influenced the 
news media response following the attacks.  Moral panic theorist, like Rothe and Muzzatti 
(2004) and Victor (2006), propose the opposite.  These scholars argue that the media response 
controlled public fear.  In this section, the moral panic perspective on the media response to 9/11 
is looked at in greater detailed and compared to the normative tragedy actuated response  
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As Rothe and Muzzatti stated themselves, the media has two primary roles ―they control 
the flow of information, while making the news entertaining to sell‖ (Rothe and Muzzatti 2004: 
335).  After 9/11, terrorism was put at the forefront of everyone’s mind.  Thus, given the media’s 
primary objectives and the attacks’ significance, increasing information flow and making the 
news entertaining to sell was easy for media outlets. Considering terrorism was the primary 
concern in the years after 9/11, naturally news coverage, oriented around the attacks, increased 
tremendously.  The data presented in chapter four portrayed the significant increase in terrorism 
related articles for all twenty newspapers used in the study.  Data analyses indicate the 
information flow during the five years prior to 9/11 was significantly lower than the five years 
after.  As Rothe and Muzzatti accurately state, one objective of the media is to make the news 
entertaining, with that, the normative tragedy actuated response argues, after 9/11 the news 
media appealed to current public concerns in order to stimulate consumer attention.  Rothe and 
Muzzatti claim much of the news content portrayed a ―sacrosanct doctrine‖ of the ―embodiment 
of evil‖ (2004:334), which they call terrorvision.  Rothe and Muzzatti describe terrorvision as ―a 
choreography of violence, fear, revulsion and hatred‖ (2004:333).  However, since news 
coverage is directed at current public concerns; ―terrorvision‖ in news media coverage was 
simply an articulation of the sentiment already maintained by the public sector.  ―Terrorvision‖ 
did not portray any beliefs or opinions that the public did not already sustain. 
Moral panic theorist will refute this belief and argue, although the media coverage after 
9/11 was aimed at appealing to the current public concerns; it also perpetuated those concerns 
even more so.  The news coverage was portrayed in such a way that it increased public concern 
and fear regarding the terrorism threat even further.  Rothe and Muzzatti argue the media greatly 
influenced the public perception of the terrorist attacks.  These scholars believe the media was 
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the ―principle vehicle‖ (2004: 334) in establishing public fear.  According to Rothe and Muzzatti, 
the media ―escalated the shock of the attacks‖ (2004: 334) and propagated a misguided 
representation of the event.  Due to this insistent personification, public opinion was greatly 
influenced.  Rothe and Muzzatti claim the ―media spasms of seismic scale‖ (2004: 334) 
increased public fear and over represented the terrorism threat, in turn, it established a moral 
panic.  With the implementation of a moral panic the State was able to achieve political and 
economic agenda.  Rothe and Muzzatti state, through propaganda ―the average American was 
transformed into a factotum of State discourse, organizing agent of hegemony, and proactive 
resonator of terrorology‖(2004: 334).  The media ensured a moral panic which enabled the State 
to exploit the public fear surrounding the moral panic and gained support for political agendas, 
from Rothe and Muzzatti’s perspective.   
With that logic, the media influence should be greatest in areas where public fear and the 
perception of an existential threat are the least.  Ensuring a moral panic undoubtedly is more 
difficult to accomplish if the threat is not clearly prevalent within a particular area or community.  
The fundamentally concepts of a moral panic argue the threat posed on society is over 
exaggerated by the media, thus,  if the threat is not even directly prevalent within a community, it 
is reasonable to believe a moral panic is more difficult to establish and the media response will 
be greater. This should be the case in areas that did not suffer the direct physical impacts of the 
attacks.  Areas other than New York City, Washington D.C., and Shanksville, Pennsylvania
17
 did 
not experience direct exposure to the physical consequences.  Given the separation from the 
event and the absence of an actual attack, the fear and perception of an existential threat are 
                                                          
17
 The Shanksville newspaper was not included in this study, because archive records are not maintained by the 
newspaper and there was no way of finding accurate data. 
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lower in these regions. Implementing a moral panic must require greater media influence.  
However, contrary to Rothe and Muzzatti’s argument, the initial media response was identical 
between the newspapers located in directly impacted cities, New York Times and Washington 
Post, and the newspapers located in non-impacted cities, all other newspapers.  In fact, the 
information flow in newspapers located in the directly impacted cities was significantly higher 
starting in 2007, opposite of what the moral panic theory indicates.  Regardless, there was no 
difference during the first five years and four months (2001 post 9/11-2006). This finding 
empirically reveals the media influence was not greater in un-impacted cities.   
Likewise, fear and perception of an existential threat is also lower in areas with a low risk 
of future terrorist attacks.  Considering the probability and perception of the attack is 
significantly less than the high risk areas a moral panic is more difficult to establish in these 
areas.  Since the risk of the threat, terrorism, is not clearly prevalent, the media must ―over-
hype‖(Victor 4:2006) the perceived threat even more so in order to establish a moral panic.    
The findings in chapter four reveal the newspapers located in cities with a low risk of future 
terrorist attacks did not sustain a media response any different than those with a high risk.  
 Furthermore, the data analyses also indicate that the information flow was not 
significantly different in areas with far proximity, even though Rothe and Muzzatti’s argument 
inherently claims it should.  In fact, the findings revealed no difference in the initial media 
response between any of the four geographical regions.  According to the moral panic theory, the 
difference in impact, risk level, and proximity should yield significantly different media 
responses, however, this did not hold true for either.  Rothe and Muzzatti claim the media served 
as the ―principle vehicle‖ in shaping public opinion and ensuring a moral panic, however, the 
data refutes this belief and shows there is no evidence that the media played any role in ensuring 
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a moral panic.   As was discussed earlier, my theory argues, given the media’s two primary 
objectives, the media simply oriented the news to appeal to public.  With that, terrorvision was 
no more than an articulation of the opinions already maintained by the public sector.  The 
increased information flow was contingent upon tragedy fixated apprehension.  Public fear 
effectively controlled the media response, not vice versa as Rothe and Muzzatti claim.  Although 
appealing to public concern was the media’s primary function, it also maintained another 
unintentional function, which was much more instrumental in the 9/11 societal response.  
However, first the final shortcoming in Rothe and Muzzatti’s theory regarding the media’s 
response to 9/11 must be addressed.      
As is mentioned previously, Rothe and Muzzatti’s perspective proposes the media 
response to 9/11 established a moral panic.  In turn, Rothe and Muzzatti, inherently, applied a 
fundamental concept of the moral panic theory originally established by Cohen (1972), which 
stated ―its nature [the threat] is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass 
media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians, and other right-thinking 
people…‖ (Cohen [1972] 2002: 1).  The moral panic theory essential argues conservative media 
sources shape public fear and are responsible for ensuring moral panics.  With that, another 
shortcoming is presented in this application of the moral panic theory.  In regards to terrorism, 
―moral barricades‖ are not established by a specific group. Crediting ―editors, bishops, 
politicians, and other right-thinking people‖ with the moral condemnation of terrorism is an 
inaccurate evaluation.  Liberal or conservative, terrorism is unanimously morally condemned, 
with the exception of the terrorist organizations themselves and various sympathizers.  Terrorism 
is an infringement upon the people’s freedom and safety, and is unanimously unaccepted, at least 
within the United States.  Terrorism is not like other issues the moral panic theory is typically 
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applied to (i.e. sex and drugs).  It is not a subculture that a portion of mainstream society 
embraces and supports, while the another portion condemns it. Terrorism is a threat to the well 
being of society, and there is no debate over whether it is acceptable or not.  Rothe and Muzzatti 
inherently claim the right-wing defined terrorism as a threat to the values and interests of society 
and were responsible for ―moral condemnation, and propagate a brutal fascination with the 
terrorist act‖ (Rothe and Muzzatti 2004: 333).  With that logic, one would expect the 
conservative news media response to be greater than the liberal news media response; however, 
the data analyses empirically shows the liberal and conservative news media responses were 
almost identical.  In fact, 2001 and 2004 were the only years after 9/11 that the conservative 
news media sustained a higher information flow level than the liberal news media.  Moreover, 
the findings even indicate the liberal newspaper sustained a significantly higher information flow 
from 2007 to 2011. The fundamental concept of the moral panic theory claims that right-wing 
media is the driving force in this phenomenon; however, this data shows this belief can not be 
true considering there is not a significant difference between the initial liberal and conservative 
news media response to 9/11.  Starting in 2005 the liberal news media surpassed the conservative 
news media with a slightly higher terrorism information flow and by 2011 still maintained a 
significantly higher level. It is evident the right-wing was not the principle vehicle in the media 
response.  The moral panic theory may be an accurate evaluation concerning more traditional 
applications, such as sex and drugs, however, concerning terrorism it is not an appropriate 
assessment.  The previous data illustrates there is no evidence a moral panic occurred after 9/11, 
and thus, refutes this aspect of Rothe and Muzzatti’s perspective on the 9/11 societal response.  
With that, the normative tragedy actuated response proposes a more accurate and comprehensive 
perspective on the media response.     
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The normative tragedy actuated response Theory argues the news media played a more 
beneficial and functional role in the post 9/11 societal response, in addition to controlling 
information flow and making the news entertaining to sell. The normative tragedy actuated 
response theory argues the media response, although unintentional, served a tremendously 
essential role in reducing public fear during the years following 9/11.  The rest of this chapter 
explains how the media response facilitated the process of searching for and finding meaning to 
the 9/11 attacks.   
Vikto Frankl, a psychologist, once wrote, ―man’s search for meaning is the primary 
motivation in his life‖ (Vikto 2006: 99), which is precisely what the public sector did following 
the 9/11 attacks.  The media response after 9/11 was essential in facilitating this process.  As was 
discussed previously, the attacks completely challenged the fundamentally belief that the world 
we live in is benevolent and predictable.  With that, feelings of vulnerability and mortality were 
significantly intensified (Janoff-Bulman 1995, Norris and Kaniasty 1991), and many suffered 
tragedy fixated apprehension.  After 9/11 many were confused as to what happened and 
struggled to make sense of everything.  Many struggled to face reality and failed to completely 
fathom the event.  With such great loss and destruction the event was difficult to comprehend 
and it left many aimlessly searching for meaning.  A great deal of past research indicates that 
following personal trauma people attempt to find meaning for their experience and that meaning 
is essential in reducing the distress and anxiety provoked by the traumatic event (Bulman and 
Wortman 1977; Frazier and Schauben 1994; Taylor 1983).  Although, most individuals did not 
personally experience the 9/11 trauma, scholars believe a collective trauma experience did, in 
fact, occur, in which identifying with the victims, according to Updegraff (2008), was sufficient 
in developing tragedy fixated apprehension.  Updegraff revealed in his longitudinal study that in 
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the months after the attacks two thirds of U.S Americans were actively attempting to make sense 
of the event. Researchers argue people attempt to find meaning by explaining why such trauma 
occurred.  Finding meaning serves two fundamental functions, ―a) meaning provides people with 
an increased sense of control and security‖(Fisher et. al 2011:1434), and ―b) even in the context 
of relatively mundane events, being able to make sense of them can rob them of their emotional 
impact‖ (Updegraff 2008: 710).  Fischer et. al (2011) reveals in his experimental research, when 
individuals cognitively understand the reasons for terrorist attacks they report lower levels of 
perceived terrorist threat and feel less threatened by terrorism.  Fisher’s findings indicate 
establishing ―intelletural meaning for an adverse event causally reduces its negative 
psychological impact‖ (Fisher et. al. 2011).  As the news media increased terrorism related 
articles in order to appeal to public concern, it unintentionally simultaneously facilitated the 
nation’s search for meaning.  Granted, my study does not investigate the content of the news 
media reports, but the mere fact that the details surrounding the attack and the terrorism 
phenomenon were discussed in an intellectual fashion gave individuals the ability to make sense 
of what happened.  Whether the news media disseminated propaganda, which Rothe and 
Muzzatti allude to, or not, made no difference.  Regardless of the validity and accuracy of the 
news reports, it still provided the public with the necessary tools to find meaning for the 
immense devastation and morbidity. Information flow increased tremendously in the months 
following 9/11.  The data analysis indicates, on average, the four months following the attack 
maintained a higher information flow than another time period.  As the media publish more 
information surrounding the event, the public was able to use that information to develop their 
own interpretations and effectively make sense of the events.  With such a drastic increase in 
terrorism related articles the public was exposed to an overwhelming volume of facts, details, 
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data, personal accounts and opinions, and academic research regarding terrorism.  In turn, this 
enabled individuals to acquire the necessary information for them to personally establish what 
they believed the attacks meant.  As knowledge on terrorism was spread, individuals became 
more familiar with the phenomenon and this enabled the public to make sense of the attacks.  
This, in turn, effectively reduced tragedy fixated apprehension within the public sector.  In his 
longitudinal study on trauma, Updegraff reveals individuals who were able to make sense of the 
attacks were less likely to report fears of terrorist attacks and displayed fewer Post Traumatic 
Stress symptoms than those who failed to do so.   In essence, the media response was a catalyst, 
first, in re-establishing a sense of control and security, and second, in reducing tragedy fixated 
apprehension within the public sector.  
 As the public was able to find meaning and make sense of the attacks adapting to the 
threat was made possible.  According to Updegraff, ―having an explanation for an emotional 
event increases the speed at which a person adapts to it‖ (Updegraff 2008: 719).   As the public 
was able to adapt to the threat, the overall terrorism concern was reduce.  Many individuals no 
longer suffered from tragedy fixated apprehension and public fear regarding terrorism declined.  
The data analyses in chapter four indirectly reveals the public adaptation.  By 2005, the 
information flow in high risk cities declined significantly and by 2007 low risk cities had 
declined significantly as well.  In fact, by 2007 the data analyses reveals there was no statistical 
difference from pre 9/11 information flow levels in both high risk and low risk cities.  
Considering the primary goal of the news media is to make information entertaining to sell, 
information flow declined as the public concern gradually turned away from 9/11.  Updegraff 
claims meaning is generally found shortly after the traumatic event and the adaptation process 
begins shortly there after, which is consistent with the findings in the data analyses.   
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Immediately after the initial media response, the information flow began to decline and it 
steadily declined through the rest of the decade.  As the public was able to find meaning and 
adapt, tragedy fixated apprehension was diminished, as too was pubic concern and the 
information flow.   
The media was an essential agent in reducing public fear, regardless of the fact it was an 
unintentional result.  Rothe and Muzzatti claim the media was responsible for exaggerating the 
threat and ensuring a moral panic, however, the data revealed no indication a moral panic ever 
occurred following 9/11.  The normative tragedy actuate response theory contends the media 
response, given the media’s primary objectives, was a normal reaction to the increased public 
concern regarding terrorism.  The next section describes the second important force in the 
National Response and Reformation, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which also greatly 
reduced public fear.     
Agents of Social Control (Federal Bureau of Investigation) 
Following a tragedy like 9/11 agents of social control become an integral part in restoring 
order.  After 9/11 the FBI experienced a tremendous organizational development, characterized 
by reorganization and reprioritization.  The FBI employed this transformation as means to a 
public security rectification which occurs following an event which compromises public safety 
and typically establishes fear and discomfort within the public sector. Public security 
rectification is employed in order to restore public safety and mitigate fear.  The public security 
rectification intensity is contingent upon three features; 1) the tragedy’s severity, 2) the risk of 
reoccurrence, and 3) the level of public fear.  The 9/11 attack is the worst terrorist attack in 
United States history and took thousands of innocent lives, thus 9/11 undoubtedly ranks highly in 
regards to the first feature.   Secondly, although it was unlikely for an attack as severe as 9/11 to 
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occur again in the near future, it was still likely for further terrorist attacks to occur, and they did.  
As was discussed in the beginning of this chapter, less than a year after 9/11 another large scale 
attack on the United States occurred, the 2002 anthrax scare.  Only five people were killed 
during the course of the anthrax attack, but it was the worst biological attack in United States 
history.  In addition, as Figure 16 at the beginning of this chapter illustrated, twenty five 
attempted terrorist attacks occurred between 2002 and 2010.  Moral panic theorists argue the 
actual threat was much lower then one was led to believe, however, although these plots 
certainly did not appear to have the potential to be as severe as 9/11, an average of almost three 
terrorist plots a year, triple that of the decade before 9/11, presents a high reoccurrence risk. Not 
to mention several small scale terrorist attacks were successfully executed in the years after 9/11.  
For example, nine people were injured when an Iranian man drove his SUV into a highly 
populated part of a university campus.  A similar incident occurred in San Francisco this time, 
unfortunately, one person was killed (fbi.gov).  The existential threat prevailed within the United 
States, and effectively established a high reoccurrence risk.  Likewise, national public fear was 
also high in the years following 9/11 as Masters (2006), Schuster (2001), and Torabi and Seo 
(2004) reveal in their respective studies.  Public security rectification intensity, in response to 
9/11, was relatively high, considering the nature of these three features.  The level of public 
security intensity is the degree of effort employed to initiate and implement public security.  The 
degree of effort is quantified differently for the various social control agents.  However, for the 
FBI, the degree of effort is quantified according to the amount of resources allocated and utilized 
towards national security programs.  Data presented in chapter three personifies the intensity of 
the FBI public security rectification.  As was explained earlier, my study focuses only on the 
FBI, because an in-depth analysis of all social control agents is far too large for one study.  The 
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FBI, as a major agent in social control, provides a good representation of the overall efforts to 
rectify public security.  The FBI recognized the importance to employ public security 
rectification in order to reduce public fear, thus the agency experienced significant changes 
throughout the past decade. 
In regards to 9/11, public security rectification efforts maintain two principal 
characteristics. The first is an accurate and objective reassessment of public security (Frost 2011: 
293).  The 9/11 attacks undermined United States national security; in turn, massive tragedy 
fixated apprehension plagued the nation. Agencies like the FBI needed to address this fear and 
restore national security.  The FBI quickly reassessed public security and employed an agency 
wide reprioritization and reorganization.  As discussed earlier, prior to 9/11 the FBI allocated and 
utilized resources predominately towards white-collar crime, violent crime, and organized/drug 
crime. Funded Staffing Level (FSL) and Average On Board (AOB) for these criminal enterprise 
programs were significantly higher then any terrorism related program. White-collar crime, 
violent crime, and organized/drug crime were at the forefront of the criminal environment for the 
past thirty years.  In the five years prior to 9/11, these programs utilized over 500 more special 
agents than any national security program (DOJ 2003:16).  The FBI exhausted resources within 
these programs at a high level since the 1970s, however, with the emergence of terrorism it was 
time the FBI reassess its priorities.  Prior to 9/11, terrorism was in fact listed as the number one 
priority, but it was not being endorsed as such.  FSL, AOB, and case work data reveal white 
collar crime was in fact being endorsed as the FBI’s most significant priority. With a new respect 
for the terrorism threat, FBI official’s objectively reassessed the most existential national threats 
and took action to enable the bureau to endorse them accordingly. Less than a year after the 
attack FBI Director Muller announced a new priority list that better classified the importance of 
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each program, and clearly established national security matters as the number one FBI priority.  
The new list better outlined which programs the FBI needed to focus the majority of resources 
and time on.  Soon after this objective reassessment, the FBI employed measures to reallocate 
resources according to the new priority list in order to better protect the nation and mitigate 
tragedy fixated apprehension.   
The second principle characteristic is the accurate realignment in public safety measures.  
After reassessing FBI operations and reevaluating priorities, the FBI then took extensive 
measures to realign public safety initiatives.  The Department of Justice data presented in chapter 
two illustrates this realignment and clearly demonstrates the FBI’s employment of public 
security rectification and its attempts to diminish public fear. The ultimate objective of public 
security rectification is to ―consider approaches that will effectively manage the public’s level of 
fear to ensure that it is neither excessively high nor too low relative to objective threat levels‖ 
(Frost 2011: 292).  Essentially agencies employing public security rectification are managing 
public fear by addressing the threat posed on society. 
The FBI effectively managed tragedy fixated apprehension by immediately increasing 
national security.  This was done systematically by reallocating resources from programs like 
white-collar crime, violent crime, and organized/drug crime, and reallocating them toward 
national security programs, National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), National 
Infrastructure Protection and Computer Intrusion Program (NIPCIP), and Domestic Terrorism 
(DT), which presented the most problematic public security issues and elicited the greatest public 
fear.  By 2003 the majority of FBI resources were allocated to terrorism related matters, while 
just two years prior white-collar crime exhausted the majority.  Prior to 9/11 only six percent of 
all FBI special agents were allocated to terrorism related initiatives; however, by 2003 this 
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increased to thirty-three percent, surpassing white collar crime as the primary focus (GAO 2004: 
6).  Resource allocation, Funded Staffing Level (FSL), for non- terrorism related matters, 
decreased almost fifteen percent by 2003 compared to 2000, while it increased almost twenty-six 
percent for terrorism related matters (DOJ 2004: 6).  Agent utilization, Average On Board 
(AOB), for national security measures are classified information, however, it is assumed they 
increased significantly given the profound decline in white-collar crime (21.5%), violent crime 
(30%), and organized/drug crime (44%) (2004:37). Furthermore, in 2003, the FBI opened sixty 
percent more terrorism related cases, and thirty percent less non-terrorism related cases 
compared to 2000 (2004: 17).  It is evident the FBI initiated active measures to realign resources.  
By 2003 the FBI endorsed national security as the most significant threat to the nation, by 
redirecting resources from various criminal enterprise matters.  This realignment in public safety 
measures was an essential part in rectifying public security and diminishing tragedy fixated 
apprehension.       
The moral panic theory establishes a fundamentally different, and inaccurate, perspective.  
Rothe and Muzzatti did not interpret the social control agents’ response to 9/11 as means of 
restoring public safety and diminishing public fear, but rather as a way to exploit public fear in 
order to control the public. In the case of 9/11, according to Rothe and Muzzatti, after the media 
―enraged the public and marshaled their support against evil-doers‖ (Rothe and Muzzatti 2004: 
336), social control agents utilized public fear to employ infringing national security operations 
which allowed law enforcement agencies to better exert their power over the public.  Huge law 
enforcement operations, Rothe and Muzzatti claim, increase public fear even further and create 
uncertainty and insecurity within the public sector.  Rothe and Muzzatti claim ―Fear was 
continuously instilled in the public with escalations of terror alerts‖ (Rothe and Muzzatti 2004: 
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337).    For example, after 9/11 the Department of Homeland Security was established to ensure 
national security, and with that the National Terrorism Advisory System was created.  This alert 
system is used to quantify the risk level within a particular area at any given time.  The advisory 
system uses a five color rating system, green (Low), blue (Guarded), yellow (Elevated), orange 
(High), and red (Severe).  Rothe and Muzzatti argue this advisory system was an ―effective tool 
for maintaining fear and suppression of its citizens‖ (2004:341). Maintaining public fear and 
making the public sensitive to the threat, Rothe and Muzzatti state, was means to pass 
unconstitutional legislation. ―Creating a generalized fearfulness gives state leaders greater 
freedom of action to advance and justify exceptional legislation, encroach on civil liberty rights, 
and accomplish their geo-political agendas‖ (2004: 336).  Although a certain level of injustices 
were produced during the 9/11 societal response which are mentioned later, inherently, Rothe 
and Muzzatti perspective is inaccurate and misinterprets the true objectives maintained by social 
control agents, like the FBI.  The objectives of social control agents’ response to 9/11 was not 
increase public fear and achieve political agendas, but rather to decrease public fear and ensure 
national security.  
In addition, Rothe and Muzzatti personify the 9/11 response maintained by social control 
agents as over excessive and disproportionate by explaining that, while terrorism related 
operations drastically escalated, ―State criminality (and/or encouragement for human rights 
violations) was neutralized, and ceased to be of concern; in fact, it disappeared through 
discursive strategies‖ (Rothe and Muzzatti 2004: 338).  However, the concern for state 
criminality did not ―cease‖ as Rothe and Muzzatti argue.  Certainly, criminal enterprise matters 
became less concerning, but, given the threat terrorism presented to the nation it was not 
unreasonable to rank those matters second to national security.  Rothe and Muzzatti are 
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misinformed on this matter considering between 2003 and 2009 FBI resources were redirected 
back to ―state criminality.‖ For example, compared to 2003, by 2009 the violent crime program 
experienced a fourteen percent increase in utilized agents and the organized crime/drug program 
experienced a twenty-four percent increase.  The normative actuated response describes this as a 
response regulation.  In the wake of a societal response it is not unfeasible for that particular 
response to exceed the necessary and appropriate action.  With that, response regulation occurs 
when the excessive societal reaction is detected and corrected.  In between 2001 and 2003 the 
FBI utilized an excessively low level of resources in the violent crime program, many of which 
were being used in terrorism related matters.  Nonetheless, as mentioned above, by 2009 the FBI 
initiated response regulation and redirected resources back to violent crime and organized crime.  
In addition, starting in 2002 the FBI tremendously over utilized resources, 845 agents, in 
terrorism related matters, and, conversely, criminal enterprise programs significantly under 
utilized resources, 879 agents.  However, with response regulation the FBI corrected this 
inappropriate resource usage and by 2009 terrorism programs over utilized only six agents, while 
criminal enterprise programs maintained an insignificant underutilization.  Throughout the public 
security rectification the FBI sustained the fragile task in mitigating tragedy fixated apprehension 
while also maintaining an appropriate response to the terrorism threat.  If the societal response is 
not regulated properly it can evolve uncontrollably and potentially turn into a moral panic.  
However, the FBI regulated the public security rectification appropriately and maintained a 
proportional response to 9/11.  The FBI organizational development predominately took place 
during the initial two year after 9/11, thus, this is when public security rectification was at 
greatest intensity.  Drastic changes and adaptations were made immediately preceding the 
attacks, as the data presented earlier in the chapter represents.  Although the greatest changes 
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were initiated between 2001 and 2003, this did not continue through the entire decade.  The FBI 
public security rectification intensity slowly diminished between 2004 and 2009.  If the FBI had 
continued public security rectification at the same intensity as the first two years, it is possible a 
moral panic could have developed.  Regardless, contrary to Rothe and Muzzatti’s beliefs, the 
FBI properly regulated security rectification efforts, thus, maintained an appropriate response in 
proportion to the threat.  As tragedy fixated apprehension subsided, security rectification efforts 
did as well.  Granted, the FBI has not returned to pre-9/11 resource allocation and utilization 
levels because it is imperative the bureau ensure continued future public security.  The FBI is 
now primarily an intelligence driven agency and national security is still the FBI’s number one 
priority. This realignment in priorities enabled the FBI to increase national security operations 
and effectively rectify public security; as a result public fear was largely mitigated. 
Although the FBI is only one agent of social control, the agency’s organizational 
transformation post 9/11, demonstrates the efforts to mitigate public fear through increased 
national security.  Rothe and Muzzatti argue the response actually increased and exploited public 
fear, however data indicates otherwise.  FBI played an essential role in reducing tragedy fixated 
apprehension, not exploiting it, and restoring pubic safety.  Without this response the nation 
would still be highly vulnerable to more attacks. 
Tragedy fixated apprehension controlled the FBI response as it similarly did with the 
news media.  The media and FBI response to tragedy fixated apprehension are two primary 
aspects of the National Response and Reformation.  The 9/11 National Response and 
Reformation was beneficial to society, granted, there are indeed certain adverse consequences 
that developed.  These consequences are the fourth and final characteristic of the normative 
tragedy actuated response and are discussed in the next section. 
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4. Adverse Consequences  
The final principle characteristic of the normative tragedy actuated response is the 
ensuing adverse consequences produced during the societal response.  With large scale social 
change it is inevitable negative consequences will indeed be created.  As society responds to a 
tragic event, certain measures are hastily employed without adequate assessment of the benefits 
and consequences.  As the moral panic theory states, long lasting repercussions regarding legal 
and social policy injustices may pursue (Rothe and Muzzatti 2004: 328).  After the 9/11 response 
the primary consequence appeared to exist in regards to public policy.  Immediately after 9/11, 
legislation was passed which gave law enforcement agencies the ability to better protect against 
terrorism.  Law enforcement officials wanted to ensure another attack would never happen again. 
As a result, laws and policies were written specifically for the purpose to identify potential 
terrorist threats.  With that, the public became outraged with many policies created to improve 
national security. Many of these policies were inherently unconstitutional and illegal.  For 
example, many argue the 2002 USA Patriot Act encroaches on the civil liberties granted to the 
people through the Constitution.  The USA Patriot Act broadened law enforcement agencies 
ability to conduct intelligence gathering operations (e.g. wire taps and electronic surveillance).  
In addition, it also reduced restrictions regarding detaining and deporting immigrants.  Among 
other controversial legislature and presidential executive orders, the USA Patriot Act indeed 
presents legal issues.  Public resistance to these policies is certainly understandable and justified 
given the many injustices ingrained in the legislation. However, the resistance to these policies is 
inherently a debate between freedom and security.  The fact of the matter is laws like the USA 
Patriot Act are essential in ensure national security.  Opposition to these legislation ―emanate 
from lack of understanding‖ regarding law enforcement intelligence and its benefits (Sommers 
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1986:25).  Law enforcement agencies can not effectively protect the nation without the power 
granted in these laws. Many individuals argue that ―snooping on citizens [is] time-wasting, 
constitutional-rights-violating, and ineffective in fighting crime‖(Berry 2004:162).  However, 
this style of law enforcement is actually the only effective approach in counterterrorism.  
Intelligence gathering is essential to terrorism prevention.  Intelligence is defined as, ―the 
product resulting from analyzing past and present activity to predict future activity, and 
suggesting implementable alternative courses of action that may be taken to interdict or 
minimize the impact of a threatening crime group or activity‖ (Sommers 1986: 25).  There are 
three main types of intelligence gathering techniques, crime analyses, investigative analyses, and 
strategic analysis.  Table 2 outlines the fundamental characteristics of each technique. 
Table 2: Three Intelligence Gathering Techniques 
Distinction Crime Analyses Investigative Analyses Strategic Analyses 
Time Element Reactive to past Responsive to Present Predictive of future 
Purpose Crime prevention Solve present case Management tool 
Subject Series of crimes Particular investigation Group or criminal activity 
(Sommers 1986: 27) 
 Crime and investigative analyses are the traditional intelligence gather styles, while strategic 
analyses gather is currently utilized in terrorism prevention efforts.  There is a tremendous 
difference between the traditional intelligence gather approaches and the contemporary 
approach.  Investigative and crime analyses are ineffective in counterterrorism.  Terrorism 
prevention requires a preventative approach, however, the crime and investigative analyses are 
respectively reactive and responsive approaches.  However, the contemporary preventative 
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approach, strategic analyses, is a highly effective approach in fighting terrorism. Strategic 
analysis is a much more difficult style of law enforcement, in which agencies must gather 
information surrounding a crime that has not yet occurred.  With that, in order to effectively 
utilize strategic analyses, law enforcement officials must maintain the capabilities to collect, 
process, analyze, and interpret information and then predict potentially threatening activity.  This 
is not possible without the capabilities granted in the legislature similar to the USA Patriot Act. 
Identifying someone who may potentially commit a crime is much more difficult then 
identifying someone who has already committed the crime, thus access to private record and 
surveillance are essential to this preventative style of law enforcement.  The ability to monitor 
suspicious individuals has been invaluable in protecting the nation against terrorism. The 
inability to do so, can have tremendous consequences, as was seen with 9/11.  According to 
Zegart (2007), when the FBI implement the 1998 Strategic Plan, the agency struggled to adopt 
the preventative style of law enforcement.  FBI officials stressed this style of law enforcement 
given the increased terrorism risk around the nation.  However, the FBI was extremely restricted 
in its ability to do so, as a result of the many intelligence gathering restrictions.  Legislation 
restricted the capability and authority to access private records and monitor suspicious 
individuals.  With the proper intelligence gather capabilities the FBI would have had the 
capability to better identify potentially threatening activity and possibly could disruptive the 9/11 
plot.  The post 9/11 legislation certainly encroaches on our freedoms and liberties, however, 
―protecting liberty and safeguarding security are inherently contradictory objectives, tradeoffs 
between them are inevitable and will continue to fuel public debate over desirable and effective 
responses‖ (Rosenfeld 2004: 29).  The question surrounding these unjust laws essentially comes 
down to whether freedom or safety is more important.  In order to maintain security against 
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terrorism a certain level of freedom must be sacrificed. Maintaining un-infringed liberties 
sacrifices security and makes the nation vulnerable to future terrorist attacks. Rosenfeld states, 
―Even Supreme Court judges have agreed that constitutional liberties must yield somewhat to 
national security exceptions under the stewardship of executive authority‖ (2004: 143).  Critics 
must look at the consequences—future terrorist attacks—of not granting law enforcement 
agencies the intelligence gathering capability.  Terrorism itself compromises our freedom, 
therefore, unfortunately, either way our freedoms are violated.  Obviously it is an unfortunate 
sacrifice that must be made; however, as Lint states, surveillance is indispensable to governing 
(Lint 2004: 142).  Anytime a tragedy like 9/11 occurs injustices and negative consequence 
similar to this are produced.  Adverse consequences are expected and must be handled 
accordingly.  Unfortunately, in this instance, there are few beneficial alternatives that can be 
employed. The public simply must trust law enforcement officials and various power holding 
individuals to use the legislature for purposes strictly related to securing the nation and 
protecting against terrorism or other relevant law enforcement processes. More research needs to 
be done focusing on whether the legislation is being used properly by law enforcement agencies 
and how it has impacted the typical law abiding citizen.  
Chapter 6: Conclusion and Limitation 
Conclusion 
The four principle characteristics of a normative tragedy actuated response fundamentally 
portray the 9/11 societal response: 1) presence of a tragic event, 2) public fear, 3) national 
response and reformation, and 4) adverse consequences. The normative tragedy actuated 
response explains how the tragic event itself produced tremendous public fear, which later 
controlled the responses sustained by the media and the FBI.  It is important to understand the 
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tragic event itself before attempting to characterize the response to the tragedy, because the 
societal response is completely contingent upon the tragedy itself.  As the controlling force in the 
9/11 response, understanding public fear is also essential. Tragedy fixated apprehension 
maintains a significant fear of the unknown and unpredictability.  This fear is created by the 
event’s various atrocities.  In turn, tragedy fixated apprehension results in a significant societal 
response.  The media and FBI response were vital in reducing tragedy fixated apprehension.  
Although these responses were functional and highly beneficial in their own right, adverse 
consequences were indeed produced as a result.  In the wake of large scale social reformation, it 
is inevitable a certain level of negative consequences will be produced.  In the case of 9/11, 
unconstitutional public policy was the most worrisome and prominent among the adverse 
consequences.  The public sector became very dissatisfied with the inherently illegal policies 
employed to increase national security; however, unfortunately, the legislature is essential in 
effectively protecting against future terrorist attacks.  Furthermore, the evidence presented in this 
chapter reveals the fundamental flaws of the moral panic theory in accurately describing the 9/11 
response. Inherently, there are two fundamental inadequacies in this moral panic application, 
which include the presence of an imminent threat and the absence of a disproportionate and 
inappropriate response.   The normative actuated response theory is a more comprehensive 
perspective which more accurately explains the 9/11 response than does the moral panic theory. 
The normative tragedy actuated response can be applied to any tragic event assuming the 
incident meets the four principle characteristics.  Understanding the 9/11 response, or any 
tragedy response, is important in understanding social change. The normative tragedy actuated 
response helps to better understand societal responses to tragic events.  The 9/11 response 
presented significant changes, which at first glance may appear excessive and unnecessary, but 
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when all aspects of the societal response are critically analyzed, the social change employed after 
9/11 is certainly understandable.  This theory also helps to understand and successfully adapt to 
the adverse consequences produced in the wake of the societal response.  The normative tragedy 
actuated response theory characterizes the functionality of the 9/11 response and encourages 
greater support for the social changes and increased protection against future violent attacks like 
9/11.   
Limitations 
My theory does propose a more comprehensive perspective on the 9/11 societal response, 
than the current literature does; however, more research on this phenomenon needs to be done.  
Sociological research in regards to terrorism, in general, has been rather sparse to date, even 
more so in regards to the societal response to 9/11.  Future research should focus on the societal 
response in its entirety, if possible.  A more general overview may be very useful.  My study 
takes a narrow approach and focused on the societal response in comparison to the moral panic 
theory.  I only examined two aspects of the response, the media and agents of social control.  
Even at that, I only examined one agent of social control, the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
Using an in depth-analysis, to examining the social control agents’ response to 9/11 in its entirety 
is far too large for one study.  The FBI is a major social control agent and is a good indication of 
what the overall response was, however, it can only be generalized to a certain extent.   More 
research should focus on all aspects, politics, law enforcement (all levels local, state, and 
federal), religion, ect.  The political sector assuming was a major agent in the 9/11 response, 
therefore, an in-depth analysis focusing primarily on that aspect would be a tremendous 
contribution to the current literature.   
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Additionally, another limitation of my study exists in the media analysis.  The data 
collection in my study only focused on the frequency of terrorism publication; however, more 
research needs to be done on the content of those news publications.  In doing so, it will provide 
further insight into the media’s role throughout the 9/11 societal response. 
Lastly, more focus should be given on the adverse consequences of the societal response. 
due to time constraints I only examined, what seemed to be the most concerning consequence.  
Undoubtedly, there are many more negative consequences that resulted from the societal 
response.  The economic impacts of counterterrorism has recently become a common theme.  
Overall, more analysis from a sociological perspective needs to be done in regards to the societal 
response to 9/11.  Just like terrorism, it is a complex phenomenon and much more research is 
required to completely understand it.  My study provided a good start to the literature and can be 
used to guide further research.   
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Percent Means for Impacted and Unimpacted City Newspapers  
Physical Impact: Percent Means (1991-2011) 
Year Impacted UnImpacted  
1991 1.75 2.52 
1992 1.25 1.73 
1993 1.76 2.27 
1994 1.38 1.88 
1995 1.99 2.63 
1996 1.99 2.91 
1997 1.63 2.53 
1998 2.26 2.89 
1999 2.19 2.42 
2000 2.08 2.18 
2001 (pre) 1.56 1.43 
2001 (post) 11.36 13.94 
2002 13.59 14.93 
2003 10.17 10.16 
2004 9.77 9.09 
2005 7.31 6.33 
2006 6.94 6.23 
2007 5.39 4.3 
2008 4.44 2.96 
2009 3.61 2.47 
2010 3.39 2.59 
2011 2.79 1.99 
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Appendix B: Proximity Percent Means  
Proximity: Percent Means (1991-2011) 
Year Northeast West Midwest South 
1991 1.91 3.93 1.31 2.37 
1992 1.39 2.22 0.94 1.95 
1993 2.1 2.68 1.32 2.49 
1994 1.65 2.06 1.07 2.18 
1995 2.33 3.31 1.8 2.58 
1996 2.49 2.16 1.93 3.8 
1997 2.13 1.78 1.69 3.26 
1998 2.58 1.94 1.89 3.76 
1999 2.46 1.81 1.65 3.25 
2000 2.05 1.67 1.71 2.88 
2001 (pre) 1.49 1.55 0.92 1.66 
2001 (post) 12.44 14.15 14.55 13.45 
2002 13.51 13.42 18.98 13.87 
2003 10.02 9.03 12.32 9.53 
2004 9.93 8.39 8.2 9.34 
2005 6.97 6.28 7.4 5.53 
2006 6.34 6.57 6.89 5.54 
2007 4.35 4.44 5.05 3.91 
2008 3.5 3.14 3.55 2.65 
2009 3.42 2.65 3.2 1.87 
2010 3.13 2.4 3.19 2.46 
2011 2.19 2.12 2.73 1.7 
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Appendix C: Percent Means for High Risk and Low Risk City Newspapers 
Risk Level: Percent Means (1991-2011) 
Year HRC Newspapers LRC Newspapers 
1991 2.42 2.65 
1992 1.7 1.77 
1993 2.3 2.21 
1994 1.75 1.97 
1995 2.72 2.44 
1996 2.45 3.18 
1997 2.17 2.74 
1998 2.53 3.11 
1999 2.4 2.43 
2000 2.15 2.21 
2001 (pre) 1.75 1.15 
2001 (post) 12.45 14.83 
2002 13.44 15.98 
2003 9.68 10.44 
2004 9.47 8.52 
2005 6.57 6.18 
2006 6.25 6.21 
2007 4.55 4.17 
2008 3.46 2.79 
2009 2.93 2.35 
2010 2.81 2.65 
2011 1.99 2.23 
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Appendix D:  Percent Means for Conservative and Liberal Newspapers 
Political Orientation: Percent Means (1991-2011) 
Year Conservative Liberal 
1991 2.27 2.72 
1992 1.71 1.74 
1993 2.27 2.26 
1994 1.98 1.74 
1995 2.63 2.57 
1996 3.46 2.2 
1997 3.02 1.94 
1998 3.41 2.28 
1999 2.56 2.29 
2000 2.37 2.02 
2001 (pre) 1.42 1.48 
2001 (post) 15.38 12.22 
2002 14.36 14.99 
2003 9.71 10.35 
2004 9.59 8.5 
2005 5.52 7.08 
2006 5.96 6.45 
2007 4.11 4.56 
2008 2.72 3.45 
2009 1.88 3.26 
2010 2.33 3.05 
2011 1.82 2.34 
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